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As part of this thesis’ introduction, the objectives (1.1), the scope delimitation (1.2), the sources 
and methodology used in this work (1.3) shall be looked into. 
 
1.1. Objectives 
The starting point for this master thesis is the question of the role that tradition plays in fishing 
and how it can be translated into general international law. Fisheries activities have been carried 
out throughout history, however on a smaller and less industrial scale than nowadays.1 The 
issue of fishing practices is parallel to the extension of coastal States’ sovereignty and 
jurisdiction over large parts of what used to be the high seas. Thus, access to fisheries resources 
or allocation of fishing opportunities have become central questions over time. Maritime areas 
that used to be governed by the freedom of fishing may now find themselves under the control 
of coastal States.2 This could be an issue for fishermen from a certain State who traditionally 
fished in an area that now belongs to another State. There is a need in this case to secure these 
practices on which local communities’ livelihoods rely. This could be done through the 
recognition of historic or traditional fishing rights. 
Historic and traditional fishing rights are customary rights, which means that they are not 
sanctioned by treaties or conventions, but solely by practice, that can become opposable to the 
coastal State.3 Written bilateral or multilateral agreements can take these rights into 
consideration; however, they face a certain amount of opposition by some States.4 Therefore, 
the relevance of historic and traditional fishing rights is particularly interesting in the light of 
the ‘conventionalization’ of the international law of the sea. By this term is meant the always 
increasing drafting of agreements, taking over an international legal regime mostly based on 
custom. This can be witnessed through the ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention 
(LOSC)5, which represents the most important legal regime for the oceans nowadays.6 These 
 
1 See T.W. Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea: An Historical Account of the Claims of England to the Dominion 
of the British Seas, and of the Evolution of the Territorial Waters: With Special Reference to the Rights of the 
Fishing and the Naval Salute (William Blackwood and Sons, Edinburgh and London, 1911), accessible at 
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/54977/54977-h/54977-h.htm, p. 604 et seq [hereinafter: Fulton, The Sovereignty 
of the Sea]. 
2 See D.R. Rothwell, T. Stephens, The International Law of the Sea, 2nd edition (Hart, Oxford and Portland, 
Oregon, 2016), p. 1 et seq [hereinafter: Rothwell, Stephens, The International Law of the Sea]. 
3 S. Kopela, ‘Historic fishing rights in the law of the sea and Brexit’ (2019), 32 Leiden Journal of International 
Law 695, p. 698 [hereinafter: Kopela, ‘Historic fishing rights in the law of the sea and Brexit]. 
4 Ibid., p. 706. 
5 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 [hereinafter: LOSC, 1982]. 
6 Rothwell, Stephens, The International Law of the Sea, supra note 2, p. 14. 
6 
developments involve a reduction of the places of ‘absolute freedom’ on the seas, especially 
through the extension of coastal States’ jurisdiction and sovereignty, as was explained earlier. 
Thus, it is interesting to examine whether historic and traditional fishing rights as customary 
rights also disappeared to leave room for new fisheries conventions, management organizations 
or if they carried out throughout time. 
In relation to these first considerations on historic and traditional fishing rights, it is interesting 
to analyze whether an event such as Brexit could mean their revival, if it is to be assumed that 
these rights were overtaken by treaties. The referendum held on 23 June 2016 that settled for 
the exit of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU) created great uncertainty. 
At the time when this thesis was drafted, no agreement on fisheries had been found, even if the 
UK had already officially left the EU on 31 January 2020. Application of EU law continues; 
however, questions about future relations remain, after years of free and mutual access to 
fisheries resources in the UK’s and other EU Member States’ waters.7 Even if restrictions on 
the access to these resources existed before Brexit in order to guarantee a certain level of 
sovereignty to the UK, there shall be in the future even greater control by the British authorities 
over their own waters and fisheries resources. 
Certain communities of fishermen might consider themselves harmed by what these greater 
restrictions will represent.8 Indeed, transboundary fisheries activities have been carried out by 
nationals of all States9 even before the UK became part of the EU in 1973.10 These practices 
did not stop between 1973 and 2016, or respectively 2020, which as a consequence only 
strengthened fisheries activities and reliance of local communities on these activities. During 
these years, the UK was part of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP)11 which created a united 
European Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), in which all Member States have access to 
resources.12 Historic and traditional fishing rights which were touched upon earlier, could be 
considered in the context of Brexit and the exit from the CFP. On top of Brexit, the denunciation 
 
7 Brexit: UK leaves the European Union, BBC, 1 February 2020, available at https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-
politics-51333314, consulted on 22 August 2020 [hereinafter: Brexit: UK leaves the European Union, BBC]. 
8 C. Bradley, EU panic: French fishermen ‘very scared’ as Brexit trade talks stall, Express, 13 August 2020, 
available at https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/1322310/eu-fisheries-news-french-fishermen-scared-brexit-
trade-talks-spt, consulted on 22 August 2020. 
9 Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea, supra note 1, p. 604 et seq. 
10 Treaty Concerning the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, the Kingdom of Norway and the United 
Kingdom to the EEC and the EAEC, 22 January 1972, L73 OJ. 
11 European Parliament and Council Regulation 1380/2013, 11 December 2013, OJ L 354/22 [hereinafter: EU 
Regulation 1380/2013]. 
12 Art. 3(1)(d) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 26 October 2012, OJ C 326/47 [hereinafter: 
TFEU, 2012]. 
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by the UK of the London Fisheries Convention (LFC)13 is also of importance.14 This convention 
predates the CFP and was a steppingstone towards an integrated European fisheries regime. If 
it is to be assumed that early fishing practices predating the EU and continuing through the CFP 
can be qualified as historic and traditional fishing rights, their survival has to be considered.  
After Brexit and the denunciation of the LFC, such rights could be revived in order to even out 
the effects of strong limitations on transboundary fisheries access. 
Following these first considerations on the objective of the thesis, questions arise that will serve 
as a breadcrumb trail throughout this work. First, are historic and traditional fishing rights of 
any relevance in the current international legal order or could they have been overtaken by an 
always expanding importance of treaties and other written agreements? Second, could the 
uncertainties arisen after Brexit, be partly solved through a recourse to these rights in order to 
preserve the interests of local fishing communities or should other preserving mechanisms be 
taken into consideration? 
 
1.2. Scope delimitation: Differentiating historic rights from historic and traditional 
fishing rights 
In order to narrow down the topics addressed in this thesis, it is essential to define the different 
notions at hand, such as historic rights, historic waters, historic and traditional fishing rights. 
These notions are not precisely and extensively defined, and it is difficult to draw a precise 
distinction between them. The purpose of the thesis is to study historic and traditional fishing 
rights in the current context of international law and investigate the relevance of Brexit in that 
matter. 
Definitions of these terms were given by the South China Sea Award and they will be used 
throughout this work.15 The notion of historic rights is as follows:  
The term ‘historic rights’ is general in nature and can describe any rights that a State may possess 
that would not normally arise under the general rules of international law, absent particular 
 
13 UK Depository Status List, Fisheries Convention, signed at London, 9 March – 10 March 1964, available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/625470/15._Fi
sheries_Convention__1964__status.pdf [hereinafter: LFC, 1964]. 
14 V. Schatz, ‘Brexit and fisheries access – Some reflections on the UK’s denunciation of the 1964 London 
Fisheries Convention,’ (2017), European Journal of International Law, accessible at 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/brexit-and-fisheries-access-some-reflections-on-the-uks-denunciation-of-the-1964-
london-fisheries-convention/. 
15 South China Sea Arbitration (The Philippines v. China), Merits, Award (2016), PCA case 2013-19 [hereinafter: 
South China Sea Arbitration]. 
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historical circumstances. Historic rights may include sovereignty, but may equally include more 
limited rights, such as fishing rights or rights of access, that fall well short of a claim of 
sovereignty.16 
Historic rights are described as on overarching term, covering claims based on sovereignty over 
maritime areas and claims based on certain practices that do not require sovereignty, such as 
historic and traditional fishing rights. When they fall short of sovereignty, historic rights can be 
of two kinds: historic rights with quasi-territorial or zonal impact and historic rights as activities 
performed non-exclusively in the maritime zones of other States. These activities encompass 
passage or fishing for instance.17 These activities being performed non-exclusively, no 
sovereignty-like entitlement is created over the area.18 The South China Sea Arbitration 
mentions two decisions supporting this argument. The Qatar v. Bahrain case established that 
historic pearl fishing “seems in any event never to have led to the recognition of an exclusive 
quasi-territorial right to the fishing grounds themselves or to the superjacent waters.”19 The 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Continental Shelf case between Tunisia and Libya 
met a comparable decision in differentiating the legal basis for historic fishing rights from the 
regime applicable to the continental shelf.20 The defining characters of historic fishing rights 
will be later touched upon.21 
Before the South China Sea Arbitration, ‘historic rights’ were not understood in the same way. 
They could not encompass sovereignty-based claims: these were referred to as claims on 
‘historic waters.’ The regime of historic waters was laid out in a study published by the United 
Nations (UN) Secretariat in 1962 on the ‘juridical regime of historic waters, including historic 
bays.’ 22 The notion of ‘historic rights’ was used to indicate what is now referred to as ‘historic 
fishing rights.’23  
 
16 South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 15, §225. 
17 Kopela, ‘Historic fishing rights in the law of the sea and Brexit,’ supra note 3, p. 697. 
18 Ibid., p. 702. 
19 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, Merits (Judgement), [2001], ICJ 
Rep 40, §236 [hereinafter: Qatar v. Bahrain]. 
20 Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (Judgement), [1982], ICJ Rep 18, §100 [hereinafter: 
Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya]. 
21 See part 2 Historic and traditional fishing rights, p. 11. 
22 UN Secretariat, ‘Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays,’ Study prepared by the UN 
Secretariat, UN Doc A/CN.4/143, 9 March 1962, in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol II, 1962 
(New York, 1964), p. 25, §185 [hereinafter: UN Secretariat, Study on Historic Waters]. 
23 See T.L. McDorman, ‘Rights and Jurisdiction over Resources in the South China Sea: UNCLOS and the ‘Nine-
Dash Line,’’ in South China Sea Disputes and the Law of the Sea, S. Jayakumar, T. Koh, R.C. Beckman (Edward 
Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham, 2014) [hereinafter: McDorman, ‘Rights and Jurisdiction over Resources 
in the South China Sea’] ; C.R. Symmons, Historic Waters in the Law of the Sea: A Modern Reappraisal (Martinus 
Nijhoff, Leiden, 2008) [hereinafter: Symmons, Historic Waters in the Law of the Sea]. 
9 
Among ‘historic rights’ as a general term, ‘historic waters’ (based on sovereignty) and ‘historic 
fishing rights’ (based on practices falling short of sovereignty) do not require the same elements 
in order to be established. Historic waters demand more requirements than historic fishing 
rights. According to the UN Secretariat study, it is commonly accepted that ‘historic waters in 
order to be established, require an “effective exercise of sovereignty,” that must have 
“continued during a considerable time” in “an attitude of general toleration.”24 What weight to 
give to each of these requirements is however debated. Whether they are cumulative criteria or 
if they can balance each other out is questionable.25  
When it comes to the elements required to establish the existence of ‘historic fishing rights’, 
Bernard mentions “long-established activities and the continuous exercise of these activities 
that are recognized by other States.”26 These criteria appear to be less exigent than those 
required for a claim based on historic waters,27 however, when observing case law, they appear 
to be very precise when it comes to the extent of the claim. Pearling is at stake in the Qatar v. 
Bahrain case,28 the Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago case29 was about flying fish and the Jan 
Mayen case,30 about “whaling, sealing and fishing for capelin.”31 The criterion requiring an 
effective exercise of sovereignty for historic waters is not to be established for historic fishing 
rights. 
The first criterion established by the UN Secretariat rapport on historic waters is the effective 
exercise of sovereignty. It means that the State claiming historic waters has to exercise authority 
over the claimed area.32 This element is not required for the establishment of historic and 
traditional fishing rights, which constitute an activity that is not exclusive and not necessarily 
based on adverse practice.33 This concept of adverse practice imply that there exists a claim on 
an area that is already subject to the jurisdiction or sovereignty of a State. Another State’s claim 
of historic rights where it should not have rights, is in confrontation with the holder’s rights, 
 
24 UN Secretariat, Study on Historic Waters, supra note 22, §§80, 185, 186. 
25 D.P. O’Connell, The International Law of the Sea: Volume I, 1st edition, edited by I.A. Shearer, Oxford Scholarly 
Authorities on International Law, 1982, p. 433, 434 [hereinafter: O’Connell, The International Law of the Sea]. 
26 L. Bernard, ‘The Effect of Historic Fishing Rights in Maritime Boundaries Delimitation’ (2012), LOSI 
Conference Papers, UC Berkeley-Korea Institute of Ocean Science and Technology Conference, held in Seoul, 
Korea, May 2012, p. 4 [hereinafter: Bernard, ‘The Effect of Historic Fishing Rights in Maritime Boundaries 
Delimitation’]. 
27 McDorman, ‘Rights and Jurisdiction over Resources in the South China Sea,’ supra note 23, p. 154. 
28 Qatar v. Bahrain, supra note 19. 
29 Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago, Award (2006), PCA case 2004-02, (2008) XXVII RIAA 147. 
30 Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), Merits 
(Judgement), [1993], ICJ Rep 38. 
31 Bernard, ‘The Effect of Historic Fishing Rights in Maritime Boundaries Delimitation,’ supra note 26, p. 5. 
32 UN Secretariat, Study on Historic Waters, supra note 22, §185. 
33 Kopela, ‘Historic fishing rights in the law of the sea and Brexit,’ supra note 3, p. 698. 
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which explains the term ‘adverse practice.’ Historic and traditional fishing rights can be 
established even if the fishing practices have been carried out on the high seas where there is 
freedom of fishing, thus no adverse practice. This particular aspect will be further touched 
upon.34 
The issue of sovereignty as being one aspect of historic rights appears clearly in the Fisheries 
case opposing the UK and Norway.35 In this case, Norway did not claim any historic waters but 
intended to delimit its internal waters according to its own baseline system, which had been 
allegedly used over an extended period of time. Norway argued it was making use of a historic 
right but pretended that the element of prescription related to that of adverse acquisition were 
not required. These last concepts establish that historic rights related to an area or certain 
activities are created in opposition to other States’ interests. These interests can consist in 
having sovereignty over the same area or activities,36 as well as being close geographically.37 
These historic rights are characterized as “exceptional” 38 and built at odds with existing laws.39 
Thus, Norway’s position is contrary to the very essence of historic rights, which are intrinsically 
based on the historic practice’s apparent unlawfulness. These rights are only justified by the 
fact that they appear through a process of continuous usage, through a long period of time, 
which grants them a historic character and qualifies them as prescriptive rights.40 
 
1.3. Sources and Methodology 
The scope delimitation already gave better insight into what kind of sources will be used 
throughout this thesis. Treaties and customary law as sources of international law will be looked 
into quite extensively.41 These conventions might be multilateral such as the LOSC or the CFP 
Regulation and the LFC on a European level. Bilateral agreements such as the voisinage 
arrangements that will be looked into are also important elements for this thesis. Jurisprudence 
 
34 See part 2.1.1.2 The legal nature of historic and traditional fishing rights, p. 14. 
35 Fisheries (United Kingdom v. Norway), Merits (Judgement), [1951], ICJ Rep 116 [hereinafter: Fisheries case]. 
36 Kopela, ‘Historic fishing rights in the law of the sea and Brexit,’ supra note 3, p. 698. 
37 G. Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951-54: General Principles and 
Sources of Law’ (1953), 30 British Yearbook of International Law 1, p. 31 [hereinafter: Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law 
and Procedure of the International Court of Justice’]. 
38 Kopela, ‘Historic fishing rights in the law of the sea and Brexit,’ supra note 3, p. 697, 698. 
39 Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice,’ supra note 38, p. 28. 
40 See Black’s Law Online Dictionary, available at https://thelawdictionary.org/prescription/, consulted on 22 June 
2020 [hereinafter: Black’s Law Online Dictionary]. 
41 Art. 38(1)(a)(b) Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 June 1945, 33 UNTS 993 [hereinafter: ICJ-
Statute, 1945]. 
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as a subsidiary source of international law will be thoroughly investigated as well.42 Indeed, 
where conventions fail to establish a solid legal regime, courts and tribunals have helped shape 
the way historic and traditional fishing rights are to be understood and applied. To complement 
these sources, the work of scholars who investigated the topic as well as newspaper articles will 
be analyzed. 
As for the methodology of this thesis, several difficulties must be taken into account. First of 
all, one of the aspects of this work that is Brexit involves great uncertainty. Indeed, negotiations 
to come up with an agreement are still ongoing after the UK left the EU on 31 January 2020. 
Thus, historic and traditional fishing rights are only investigated in order to find out if they 
could be of any relevance in the scope of a future fisheries agreement between the UK and the 
EU. Moreover, Brexit being a very sensible and politically controversial issue, the way scholars 
from different legal backgrounds approach the topic cannot be ignored. Indeed, the perspective 
from a British author might differ from the views of a peer from Ireland, France or any other 
EU Member State. Despite the aforementioned difficulties, the approach used throughout the 
thesis will be mostly doctrinal. 
In order to discuss this thesis’ topic extensively, the historic and traditional rights regime will 
be investigated as it stands in today’s law of the sea, considering treaties and jurisprudence. 
Then, the way these rights could be considered in the scope of Brexit will be analyzed through 
legislation in the area. 
 
2. Historic and traditional fishing rights 
The legal regime of historic and traditional fishing rights has its own specificities that need to 
be clarified in order to fully grasp the extent of these rights. These particularities come with a 
few difficulties such as the definitions of the different notions at hand. They will be looked into 
in a first step (2.1). In a second step, the establishment of historic and traditional fishing rights 
has to be analyzed (2.2). This is an important element to be understood for these rights are 
customary, thus not created by a treaty. The influence that written agreements can have on 
historic and traditional fishing rights will be touched upon in a third step through the perspective 
of the LOSC ratification (2.3). 
 
 
42 Art. 38(1)(d) ICJ-Statute, 1945, supra note 42. 
12 
2.1. Clarifying the different notions 
Throughout this thesis, ‘historic’ and ‘traditional’ fishing rights are used jointly. This could 
imply that they both embrace different ideas. However, there used together in this work in order 
to avoid any misunderstanding on the fact that they actually are similar notions, as will be 
explained in a first subsection (2.1.1). Moreover, some defining elements are specifically 
related to historic and traditional fishing rights. Those will be looked into in a second subsection 
(2.1.2). 
 
2.1.1. Historic and traditional fishing rights, two similar concepts 
The difference between the general concept of ‘historic rights’ and the more specific notions of 
‘historic waters’ and ‘historic fishing rights’ has been explained, however the question whether 
a distinction can be done between historic and traditional fishing rights needs to be looked into. 
Indeed, literature and jurisprudence use both terms without justifying the use of one term or the 
other, as will be shown in a first step (2.1.1.1). However, using one or the other notion might 
help putting the emphasis on the technical legal aspect or the materiality of the fishing practice. 
Since those notions are similar, the legal nature of historic and traditional fishing rights will be 
investigated in a second step (2.1.1.2). 
 
2.1.1.1. The entwinement of both concepts in literature and jurisprudence 
The South China Sea Award refers to both concepts. The Philippines’ first and second 
submissions are related to historic rights claimed by China within the so-called ‘nine-dash 
line.’43 China’s claims to historic rights contain, among others, access to marine living 
resources in the area.44 The tenth submission of the Philippines addresses ‘traditional fishing 
rights.’ The Award expressly mentioned that the Philippines made sure not to use the 
terminology ‘historic fishing rights’ when referring to “access for its fishermen to pursue their 
traditional livelihood.”45 It appears here that the term ‘traditional fishing rights’ was used in 
order not to create confusion with the ‘historic rights’ claimed by China.46  
 
43 South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 15, §169. 
44 Ibid., §214. 
45 Ibid., §781. 
46 Ibid., §781. 
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What can be derived from this is, that the Philippines did not intend to create a distinction 
between historic and traditional fishing rights.47 The Eritrea v. Yemen Arbitration indicates the 
proximity between both concepts as well. Indeed, the case gives great insight into the traditional 
fishing regime48 and makes it clear that the fishing rights at stake in the case are historic rights 
created by traditional elements.49 The traditional fishing practices carried out in the Red Sea by 
fishermen from both countries are based on historical elements. The presence of the Ottoman 
Empire brought Islamic concepts that had a strong relevance for fishermen from Eritrea and 
Yemen, such as the “inherent right to sustain their nutritional needs through fishing from coast 
to coast with free access to fish on either side and to trade the surplus.”50 These Islamic concepts 
strengthened fishing practices in a manner intrinsically related to the geographical and political 
situation of the Red Sea between Eritrea and Yemen. 
It does not appear from both previously mentioned cases that a difference can be made on the 
scope of historic and traditional fishing rights. Moreover, the way certain scholars define 
tradition resembles what will be explained later on about the elements necessary to claim 
historic and traditional fishing rights.51 Polite insists on the fact that “something can be 
considered traditional if it has a demonstrable history of being handed down through 
generations, or by existing over a relatively long period of time.”52 
However, when it comes to the intent behind the use of one or the other word, insisting on the 
traditional character of a fishing right more than its historic character might imply a specific 
opinion on its actual scope. One view focuses primarily on the methods of fishing, by whom 
these activities are performed and for what purpose. The other puts the emphasis on the fact 
that these practices have to be carried on through time and generations.53 Settling for one or the 
other argument may indicate what activities to define as traditional and at the same time what 
terminology to use: historic or traditional fishing rights. Speaking about traditional fishing 
rights may also involve other related concepts, that do not appear as clearly when speaking 
about historic fishing rights. Indeed, it is unquestionable that the main issue behind traditional 
 
47 Kopela, ‘Historic fishing rights in the law of the sea and Brexit,’ supra note 3, p. 700. 
48 See Second stage of the proceedings between Eritrea and Yemen (Maritime Delimitation), Award (1999), PCA 
case 1996-04, (1999) XXII RIAA 335, Chapter IV [hereinafter: Eritrea v. Yemen Arbitration (Maritime 
Delimitation)]. 
49 Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute (Eritrea v. Yemen), Award (1998), PCA case 1996-04, (1998) 
XXII RIAA 211, §126 [hereinafter: Eritrea v. Yemen Arbitration (Scope of the Dispute)]. 
50 Eritrea v. Yemen Arbitration (Maritime Delimitation), supra note 49, §92. 
51 See part 2.2.1 The criteria necessary for the apparition of historic and traditional fishing rights, p. 22. 
52 D. Polite, ‘Traditional fishing rights: analysis of State practice’ (2013), 5:3 Australian Journal of Maritime & 
Ocean Affairs 120, p. 122 [hereinafter: Polite, ‘Traditional fishing rights’]. 
53 Ibid., p. 120. 
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fisheries are indigenous communities or local communities that rely on artisanal fishing to 
support their livelihoods. How far these elements are to be taken into account will be later 
looked into.54 It is the view of this thesis’ author that the actual difference between historic and 
traditional fishing rights is only a matter of vocabulary and do not imply any legal 
consequences. 
As seen earlier, both traditional and historic fishing rights are part of tribunals’ and scholars’ 
vocabulary. However, it doesn’t appear that they are differentiated and used to define different 
legal concepts. They can both play a role when it comes to establish sovereign rights as it is the 
case in the South China Sea Arbitration, or when it comes to maritime boundary delimitation 
as it is the case in the Grisbådarna Arbitration,55 where the economic dependency of Swedish 
fishermen was used as a way to adjust the provisional maritime boundary line.56 Kopela argues 
that traditional and historic fishing rights coincide in the sense that “qualitative elements of 
fishing, such as methods, gears, etc., are not relevant for the establishment of the entitlement 
but only to the ascertainment of its content.”57 To conclude and as will now be looked into, it 
does not appear from theory or jurisprudence that a different legal regime should be applied to 
both traditional and historic fishing rights, for these concepts are similar. An observation could 
be made on the purpose of the different articles on the matter. Literature about ‘historic fishing 
rights’ seem to focus more on the technicality of the applicable legal regime,58 whereas theory 
about ‘traditional fishing rights’ contain more insight about the practical exercise of these 
rights.59 More emphasis is put on the activity as such, as will be seen later on.60 
 
2.1.1.2. The legal nature of historic and traditional fishing rights 
It has been established that historic and traditional fishing rights are two similar notions. Thus, 
their legal nature is not different from one another and will now be looked into. 
 
54 See part 2.1.2.1 The concept of artisanal fishing, p. 17. 
55 Grisbådarna case (Norway v. Sweden), Award (1909), PCA case 1908-0, (1961) XI RIAA 155. 
56 Bernard, ‘The Effect of Historic Fishing Rights in Maritime Boundaries Delimitation,’ supra note 26, p. 13, the 
author does not make a distinction between traditional and historic fishing rights, as they plaid a role in the 
maritime boundary delimitation. 
57 See Kopela, ‘Historic fishing rights in the law of the sea and Brexit,’ supra note 3, p. 701. 
58 See Ibid.; S. Kopela, ‘Historic Titles and Historic Rights in the Law of the Sea in the Light of the South China 
Sea Arbitration’ (2017), 48:2 Ocean Development & International Law 181 ; V. Schatz, ‘The International Legal 
Framework for Post-Brexit EEZ Fisheries Access between the United Kingdom and the European Union’ (2019), 
35 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 133 [hereinafter: Schatz, ‘Post-Brexit EEZ Fisheries 
Access’]. 
59 See Polite, ‘Traditional fishing rights,’ supra note 53. 
60 See part 2.1.2.1 The concept of artisanal fishing, p. 17. 
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Kopela establishes that historic fishing rights, as historic rights falling short of sovereignty, can 
be described as non-prescriptive rights and do not necessarily need an adverse practice for their 
formation.61 These two elements are what differentiate historic and traditional fishing rights 
from historic rights based on sovereignty, such as those claimed on historic waters, as seen 
earlier.62 Contrarily to sovereignty-based historic rights, historic and traditional fishing rights 
can be based on lawful practice such as fishing activities in the high seas. Accordingly, those 
fishing rights are not exclusive when carried out in the high seas, for other States can carry out 
the same activities. Historic and traditional fishing rights need not be characterized as an 
adverse practice in order to be established. Indeed, the concept of high seas freedom of fishing 
is contrary to a fishing practice that would violate any State’s sovereignty. However, a fishing 
practice on the high seas might become an adverse practice if these high seas were to become 
part of a coastal State’s jurisdiction through the extension of the territorial sea or the creation 
of an EEZ. In order to claim historic and traditional fishing rights, certain criteria need to be 
verified and will be investigated later on.63 
Following these considerations, it can be stated that “historic fishing rights are regarded to be 
of a non-prescriptive non-exclusive nature, and they do not necessarily require adverse practice 
for their formation.”64 However, another situation could be envisaged, such as the existence of 
historic and traditional fishing rights within an area already under the sovereignty or jurisdiction 
of a coastal State. The establishment of those rights in this scenario would be different, for the 
fishing practices at stake would be contrary to the coastal State’s rights on fisheries, thus 
representing an adverse practice. Interpreting a contrario the aforementioned characteristics of 
historic and traditional fishing rights based on the freedom of the high seas, it is the view of this 
thesis’ author that these rights can be of a prescriptive nature and based on an adverse practice. 
In order to be qualified as historic or traditional fishing rights, the fishing practices need to 
fulfill the criteria analyzed later on.65 
Traditional fishing rights are discussed extensively in two cases, among others: The South 
China Sea case and the Eritrea v. Yemen case. The former describes the latter as emphasizing 
the “importance of preserving traditional fishing practices in the Red Sea which had been 
carried on for centuries, without regard for the specifics of maritime boundaries.”66 The Eritrea 
 
61 Kopela, ‘Historic fishing rights in the law of the sea and Brexit,’ supra note 3, p. 698. 
62 See part 1.2 Scope delimitation: Differentiating historic rights from historic and traditional fishing rights, p. 7. 
63 See part 2.2.1 The criteria necessary for the apparition of historic and traditional fishing rights, p. 22. 
64 Kopela, ‘Historic fishing rights in the law of the sea and Brexit,’ supra note 3, p. 698. 
65 See part 2.2.1 The criteria necessary for the apparition of historic and traditional fishing rights, p. 22. 
66 South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 15, §259. 
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v. Yemen Arbitration sees these traditional fishing rights as historically consolidated and 
building an international easement “falling short of territorial sovereignty.”67 In both cases, it 
appears clearly that historic and traditional fishing rights exist independently from boundaries 
and sovereignty. Thus, these rights can have concrete consequences, as it is reminded in the 
LOSC. This Convention states in its Article 15 that historic fishing rights can act as special 
circumstances that can modify the boundary delineation. The Eritrea v. Yemen case reminds 
this provision as it states that it is generally agreed that “the median or equidistance line 
normally provides an equitable boundary.”68 It also confirms that historic titles can adapt the 
delineation of the boundary, but the Tribunal found no reason to make use of this possibility in 
that situation.69 In the same case, the question was raised whether the traditional fishing 
practices happening between Eritrea and Yemen could influence the boundary. Both parties 
submitted their own proposal for the boundary that would take the interests of fishermen from 
both States into consideration.70 The Tribunal found that the economic dependency on fishing 
in that case cannot be proven to be so strong that it would create its own line of delimitation.71 
Moreover, no party could prove that their proposition for a line of delimitation would have 
“detrimental effects on fishing communities.”72 The legal regime of historic and traditional 
fishing rights also contains specific defining elements specifically related to these rights that 
shall now be investigated. 
 
2.1.2. Elements specifically related to historic and traditional fishing rights 
Some elements of definition have been given earlier, relating to the distinction of the different 
notions as well as the nature of the rights at stake. It shall also be explained through which 
processes such rights appear. The elements of definition that will now be touched upon are 
paramount to the understanding of historic and traditional fishing rights. Indeed, these rights 
have specific characterizing aspects that help understand how they are established. Thus, the 
link to artisanal fishing (2.1.2.1) and the characterization of historic and traditional fishing 
rights as private rights (2.1.2.2) will be investigated. 
 
 
67 Eritrea v. Yemen Arbitration (Scope of the Dispute), supra note 50, §126. 
68 Eritrea v. Yemen Arbitration (Maritime Delimitation), supra note 49, §131. 
69 Ibid., §158. 
70 Ibid., §§59, 60. 
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2.1.2.1. The concept of artisanal fishing 
More than a legal aspect of historic and traditional fishing rights, artisanal fishing is a way of 
characterizing the fishing practices that may lead to the recognition of such rights. They are 
essential in the understanding of why it is important to secure and preserve historic and 
traditional fishing rights for the sake of local communities’ livelihoods, which rely on fisheries 
activities. It is this thesis’ author’s point of view that this element might be overlooked in certain 
cases such as the South China Sea Arbitration, where legal arguments take precedence over the 
purpose of the rights at stake. This will be further looked into.73 
Making use of the term ‘traditional’ when referring to fishing practices may indicate the 
intention to insist on the importance those rights have for communities whose local economy 
rely on fisheries. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) provided guidance on artisanal 
fisheries and clearly establishes a link with ‘traditional fisheries:’ 
Traditional fisheries involving fishing households (as opposed to commercial companies), using 
relatively small amount of capital and energy, relatively small fishing vessels (if any), making 
short fishing trips, close to shore, mainly for local consumption. In practice, definition varies 
between countries, e.g. from gleaning or a one-man canoe in poor developing countries, to more 
than 20-m. trawlers, seiners, or long-liners in developed ones. Artisanal fisheries can be 
subsistence or commercial fisheries, providing for local consumption or export. They are 
sometimes referred to as small-scale fisheries.74 
However, no universal definition exists for artisanal fishing, as it is reminded by the South 
China Sea Award. Several bodies have addressed the issue, such as the FAO as seen earlier, the 
International Labor Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme.75 
The relations between artisanal fishing practices and traditional fishing rights is particularly 
stressed in the international jurisprudence as it is the case in the Eritrea v. Yemen Arbitration, 
which inquires Yemen to 
ensure that the traditional fishing regime of free access and enjoyment for the fishermen of both 
Eritrea and Yemen shall be preserved for the benefit of the lives and livelihoods of this poor and 
industrious order of men.76 
 
73 See part 2.3.2 Position of case law on the matter, p. 30; part 2.4 Concluding remarks, p. 34. 
74 FAO, Artisanal Fisheries (2005), available at http://www.fao.org/family-farming/detail/en/c/335263/, consulted 
on 29 June 2020. 
75 South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 15, §797. 
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The South China Sea Award also establishes a link between fishing practices and communities’ 
livelihoods: 
The attention paid to traditional fishing rights in international law stems from the recognition 
that traditional livelihoods and cultural patterns are fragile in the face of development and 
modern ideas of interstate relations and warrant particular protection.77 
The same Award also refers to the Eritrea v. Yemen Arbitration in order to explain that the 
element defining artisanal fishing are relative and that “the specific practice of artisanal fishing 
will vary from region to region, in keeping with local customs.”78 However, it is clear that the 
Tribunal wished to differentiate artisanal from industrial fishing practices and makes it an 
essential element in order to create a parallel with traditional fishing rights. Indeed, it states that 
“traditional fishing rights extend to artisanal fishing that is carried out largely in keeping with 
the longstanding practice of the community, in other words to ‘those entitlements that all 
fishermen have exercised continuously through the ages,’79 but not to industrial fishing that 
departs radically from traditional practices.”80 
Traditional livelihoods related to fisheries were also at stake in the South China Sea Arbitration. 
At the center of the dispute was the Scarborough Shoal, whose sovereignty was disputed. It was 
the parties’ understanding that the rights for their fishermen to carry out their activities in their 
vicinity was dependent on which State had sovereignty. As will be discussed further, the matter 
of sovereignty in this case is not relevant.81 China was accused by the Philippines of 
“unlawfully [preventing] Philippine fishermen from pursuing their livelihoods by interfering 
with traditional fishing activities at Scarborough Shoal.”82 In the tenth submission, the 
Philippines and China describe quite extensively the nature of the activities carried out by their 
fishermen and establish the link to artisanal fishing and communities’ livelihoods in a clear 
manner. The Philippines refer to the Scarborough Shoal as a “traditional fishing ground” where 
fishermen from neighbouring States would come and fish “for about a week or more.”83 These 
fishermen carried out their activity for generations using “spear and net fishing methods,” in 
 
77 South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 15, §794. 
78 Ibid., §797. 
79 See Eritrea v. Yemen Arbitration (Maritime Delimitation), supra note 49, §104. 
80 South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 15, §798. 
81 See part 2.2.2.1 In the territorial sea, p. 26. 
82 South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 15, §758. 
83 Ibid., §761. 
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order to harvest certain species.84 China states that their fishermen as well have been present in 
the area “since ancient times.”85 
The fishing methods described by the Philippines, that could be qualified as artisanal, have a 
relevance when it comes to qualify fishing rights as traditional. Indeed, the Tribunal defines the 
fishing methods protected by international law as 
those that broadly follow the manner of fishing carried out for generations: in other words, 
artisanal fishing in keeping with the traditions and customs of the region. The Tribunal is not 
prepared to specify any precise threshold for the fishing methods that would qualify as artisanal 
fishing, nor does the Tribunal deem it necessary to consider how and when traditional fishing 
practices may gradually change with the advent of technology.86 
The Abyei Arbitration87 established a link with the need to protect communities’ livelihoods 
and the special interests of indigenous communities that can be “holders of historical/traditional 
fishing rights.” However, they are not the only recipients of these rights. Other non-indigenous 
communities can be involved, which is a good way to avoid the debate around the definition of 
indigeneity, according to Kopela.88 The South China Sea and the Eritrea v. Yemen cases both 
“stress[ed] the link between the activities of fishermen and the local culture,”89 thus implying a 
link between traditional fishing rights and specific communities. Indeed, these fishing rights 
are rooted in “the rights of local people to pursue their livelihood.”90 The link to artisanal 
fisheries and local communities is an element that characterizes historic and traditional fishing 
rights as private rights as will now be looked into. 
 
2.1.2.2. The qualification as private rights 
Some uncertainties persist with regard to who can be regarded as the holder of historic and 
traditional fishing rights. The answer could seem clear-cut for States are, among others, subject 
of international law. It is not true for individuals who can possess private rights. These rights 
allow individuals to enjoy their own property.91 However, as it has been explained earlier, 
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historic and traditional fishing rights are a special field of international fisheries law. Indeed, 
there remains a strong relation to communities’ livelihoods. On the one side, these fall under a 
State’s concerns, but on the other side, the fact that these practices are not designed to provide 
great productivity and are much more focused on a specific community’s interests makes them 
deviate from sole interstate relations. The Eritrea v. Yemen Arbitration endorsed that view, 
stating that these rights are individuals and attached to communities.92 The Award refused to 
apply “the western legal fiction […] whereby all legal rights, even those in reality held by 
individuals, were deemed to be those of the State.”93 However, Kopela argues that the Eritrea 
v. Yemen Award could imply that these rights also belong to the State, thus creating a hybrid 
regime, where the State and some of its nationals would be the holders.94 The decision, in its 
second stage, states indeed that “although the immediate beneficiaries of this legal concept were 
and are the fishermen themselves, it applied equally to States in their mutual relations.”95 When 
it came to artisanal fishing, the South China Sea Arbitration agreed with this argumentation and 
stated that “artisanal fishing rights attach to the individuals and communities that have 
traditionally fished in the area. These are not the historic rights of States, as in the case of 
historic titles, but private rights.”96 Indeed, historic titles are related to the concept of 
sovereignty. Both previously mentioned cases establish that the holders of historic and 
traditional fishing rights are those exercising these activities. The only requirements to be 
entitled to those rights are a question of “nationality of the fishermen” and of their “links with 
the local community, which is not static but can be dynamic and evolving.”97 
Qualifying historic and traditional fishing rights as a hybrid regime were both the States and 
some of their nationals are the holders does however not imply that the advantages these holders 
can obtain from the historic and traditional fishing regime are the same. It is the view of this 
thesis’ author that States have above all obligations when it comes to historic and traditional 
fishing rights. Indeed, in decisions such as the South China Sea case or the Eritrea v. Yemen 
case, the States Parties were compelled to recognize rights of access for fishermen from the 
other State, regardless of matters of sovereignty or boundaries.98As such, it appears that historic 
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and traditional fishing rights remain primarily private rights whose holders are the fishermen 
carrying out their activities, and that States have to recognize and comply with. 
As a consequence of the qualification of historic and traditional fishing rights as private rights, 
certain events such as the change of sovereignty on a specific area does not impede their practice 
by the holders. The Abyei Arbitration addressed issues such as traditional rights and decided 
that they, “in the absence of an explicit agreement to the contrary, have usually been deemed 
to remain unaffected by any territorial delimitation.”99 In this specific case, traditional grazing 
rights remained unaffected by the established boundary. Similar to the Abyei Arbitration, the 
South China Sea Award mentioned the Bering Sea Arbitration100 which “exempted indigenous 
people from its division of jurisdiction with respect to the hunting of fur seals in the Bering 
Sea.”101 
The South China Sea Tribunal also develops its take on the matter of sovereignty change with 
respect to the LOSC ratification. Before the contemporary regime, certain States established 
Exclusive Fisheries Zones (EFZ), in order to protect their fisheries interests. In this case, it is 
argued that existing fishing rights could not have been impacted, for declaring an EFZ can be 
assimilated to a change of sovereignty.102 It is the solution the ICJ came up with in the Fisheries 
Jurisdiction case opposing the UK and Iceland.103 In the same way, the South China Sea 
Tribunal considered the extension of the territorial sea as being similar to a change of 
sovereignty, thus not impairing historic and traditional fishing rights.104 The same interpretation 
is not extended to the EEZ, which appeared under the LOSC. The Tribunal’s argumentation 
will be explained further.105 Now that the notions of ‘historic’ and ‘traditional’ fishing rights 
have been explained, the way these rights can be established will be investigated. 
 
2.2. Establishing historic and traditional fishing rights 
It can be generally considered that historic and traditional fishing rights are formed through the 
practice of fishermen carrying out their activities “close to the coasts where they live regardless 
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of the legal status of the maritime zones and of the gradual extension of the jurisdiction of the 
coastal States.”106 These rights go through a process of “historical consolidation,” which means 
the passing of years, decades is paramount to the very existence of those rights.107 The elements 
to take into consideration for the establishment of historic and traditional fishing rights will be 
looked into. Some of these elements have been touched upon earlier108 in order to differentiate 
historic and traditional fishing rights from sovereignty-based claims on historic titles. They 
shall now be looked into with more details in a first part (2.2.1). In a second part, the 
geographical scope of applicability of historic and traditional fishing rights will be analyzed, as 
the existence of these rights depends on it (2.2.2). 
 
2.2.1. The criteria necessary for the apparition of historic and traditional fishing 
rights 
As seen earlier, the two criteria necessary to establish the existence of a historic or traditional 
fishing right are a longstanding practice (2.2.1.1) and acquiescence by other States (2.2.1.2). 
However, these requirements carry some uncertainties that need to be looked into. 
 
2.2.1.1. A longstanding usage 
In order to grant a fishing practice its historic character, it is evident that this activity needs to 
have stretched over time. The exact amount of time is however uncertain. 
Indications brought by customary international law can be a starting point. The Asylum case 
dealt with the question. It has been found that “a consistent and uniform usage practiced by the 
States in question” is needed, in order for a customary rule to emerge. 109 When it comes to the 
duration of this usage, it is not so much the actual practice’s spreading over time as “the degree 
and the intensity” that matters. If the changes brought forth by a specific usage are of such 
intensity that they result in a dramatic revision of the practices admitted so far, and if this new 
usage is widely followed by the international community, then it “need not be spread over 
decades.”110 However, what is true for rules of customary international law, as was just 
 
106 Kopela, ‘Historic fishing rights in the law of the sea and Brexit,’ supra note 3, p. 702. 
107 Ibid., p. 702. 
108 See part 1.2 Scope delimitation: Differentiating historic rights from historic and traditional fishing rights, p. 7. 
109 Asylum case (Colombia v. Peru) (Judgement), [1950], ICJ Rep 266, p. 276. 
110 H. Lauterpacht, ‘Sovereignty over Submarine Areas’ (1950), 27 British Yearbook of International Law 376, p. 
393. 
23 
explained, is not for “the acquisition of specific and special rights by an individual State on a 
prescriptive basis,” i.e. historic rights.111 Indeed, customary rules of law are created following 
“a generalized pattern of the behaviour of many,” they are a general and collective norm 
whereas historic rights are the result of “the repetition of the same activity by one” and as such 
are individual rights with a specific holder.112 However, as was seen earlier, historic and 
traditional fishing rights differentiate themselves from historic rights, as they are not necessarily 
established on a prescriptive basis. 113 They can rely on lawful practices such as fishing on the 
high seas. But even in this case, the passage of time is an essential requirement. Indeed, as was 
seen earlier, the holders of historic and traditional fishing rights can be private individuals. In 
this case, the comments made by Fitzmaurice apply, as the practice of a historic fishing right, 
whose holder is an individual cannot constitute a widespread practice as it would be the case 
for customary international law. The essence of historic fishing rights is to be attached to a 
specific area and specific rights’ holders, as it is seen throughout this thesis. 
Moreover, the purpose of this condition is to ensure the stability of a practice. Indeed, it is 
paramount to avoid any dislocation that might result from a change of situation and would 
considerably impair the situation of historic rights’ holders. When it comes to fisheries activities 
for instance, they must have been “accustomed from time immemorial or over a long period.”114  
The Eritrea v. Yemen Arbitration confirmed that the passage of time is essential in the creation 
of a traditional fishing right. The Award states in the first stage, relating to territorial 
sovereignty and the scope of the dispute: 
The Tribunal’s [First Stage] Award on Sovereignty was not based on any assessment of volume, 
absolute or relative, of Yemeni or Eritrean fishing in the region of the islands. What was relevant 
was that fishermen from both of these nations had, from time immemorial, used these islands 
for fishing and activities related thereto.115 
The same decision in the second stage, about maritime delimitation, recognizes that “the 
traditional fishing regime covers those entitlements that all the fishermen have exercised 
continuously through the ages.”116 The Philippines in the South China Sea Award argue that 
 
111 Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice,’ supra note 38, p. 31. 
112 O’Connell, The International Law of the Sea, supra note 25, p. 433. 
113 See part 1.2 Scope delimitation: Differentiating historic rights from historic and traditional fishing rights, p. 7. 
114 Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice,’ supra note 38, p. 51. 
115 Eritrea v. Yemen Arbitration (Scope of the Dispute), supra note 50, §126. 
116 Eritrea v. Yemen Arbitration (Maritime Delimitation), supra note 49, §104. 
24 
for fishing practices to be protected by international law, they must be “longstanding, long, 
deep, peaceful, uninterrupted, ancient and having occurred since times immemorial.”117 
Finding evidence of this longstanding usage might prove to be difficult as the South China Sea 
Tribunal noticed: 
The stories of most of those who have fished at Scarborough Shoal in generations past have not 
been the subject of written records, and the Tribunal considers that traditional fishing rights 
constitute an area where matters of evidence should be approached with sensitivity. That certain 
livelihoods have not been considered of interest to official record keepers or the writers of 
history does not make them less important to those who practice them.118 
In this respect, both the Eritrea v. Yemen and South China Sea Arbitration came up with ways 
of establishing evidence of a longstanding practice. The first one mentions “the most reliable 
historical and geographical sources, both ancient and modern” as well as the “statements 
attributed to fishermen.”119 The second one referred to different ancient books, articles and 
maps.120 Next to a longstanding usage, the States impacted by the fishing practices have to 
acquiesce to these activities. What the notion of acquiescence exactly refers to shall be looked 
into.  
 
2.2.1.2. Acquiescence by other States 
On top of a longstanding usage, other States impacted by the fishing practice need to recognize 
and accept a specific practice in order for it to be qualified as a historic right.121 In matters of 
historic and traditional fishing rights, the need for ‘acquiescence’ by other States is not straight 
forward. This term involves a certain level of recognition that will now be described and is not 
always applicable for historic and traditional fishing rights. 
Acquiescence does not equal an explicit consent. It is rather the absence of protest by the 
adverse State over the practice of another State’s nationals. For acquiescence to be verified, 
quite a low threshold is required. Indeed, the historic character of a practice can be used to 
presume acquiescence. The concerned State can rebut this presumption, however, the way this 
protest can effectively interfere with the establishment of a historic right has to meet certain 
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criteria. The result of a State’s protest must be effective. It follows that a mere diplomatic 
opposition or a “formal attitude of protest” is not enough to oppose the presumption of 
acquiescence over time.122 If the State does not protest and is considered to have acquiesced to 
a specific practice in a certain area, the State can be held to have extended its acquiescence over 
the whole concerned area.123 Indeed, the Fisheries case established that Norway’s way of 
delimitating baselines was not only opposable to the UK in the area at the centre of the dispute, 
but on the whole of Norway’s coastline.124 However, a State can only protest if it has knowledge 
of the situation involving potential historic rights. In the Fisheries case, the UK could only 
protest Norway’s method based on historic rights to enclose its internal waters, if it knew that 
this was a Norwegian practice. Fitzmaurice brings forth two principles related to this issue. 
First, a State cannot be held to have knowledge of another’s State legislation or regulation, 
except if it was made aware of it by way of official communication or by any other unmistakable 
mean. It can be an incident between British nationals and the Norwegian authorities in what 
Norway considers to be its internal waters. Second, States can rely on generally accepted 
international law for the protection of their interests and cannot be prejudiced if they don’t 
object right away.125 
The requirements needed for acquiescence to be verified are only applicable in the case where 
a specific activity faces an adverse practice. What situation is meant by ‘adverse practice’ has 
been touched upon earlier.126 If the fisheries activities took place in the high seas, where 
freedom of fishing is granted, no ‘adverse practice’ can take place, thus no acquiescence is 
required. However, if the fisheries activities were to take place in the territorial sea under the 
sovereignty of a specific State, acquiescence by that State would be needed. Thus, the question 
of the geographical applicability of historic and traditional fishing rights is central and will now 
be looked into. 
 
2.2.2. The geographical applicability of historic and traditional fishing rights 
As explained earlier, historic and traditional fishing rights are non-excusive and do not 
necessarily require adverse practice for their formation.127 These characteristics explain why 
 
122 Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice,’ supra note 38, p. 29. 
123 Ibid., p. 40. 
124 Fisheries case, supra note 36, p. 138. 
125 Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice,’ supra note 38, p. 34. 
126 See part 2.1.1.2 The legal nature of historic and traditional fishing rights, p. 14. 
127 Ibid. 
26 
continuous fisheries activities on the high seas could give rise to historic fishing rights once the 
same high seas become part of a State’s territorial sea or EEZ. This is however a debated issue. 
Some authors argue for the validity of this theory,128 as well as some jurisprudence, such as the 
Eritrea v. Yemen case,129 while other authors130 and court decisions pronounced themselves 
against it, such as the South China Sea Arbitration.131 The matter at hand is not to investigate 
whether historic and traditional fishing rights can emerge on the high seas, but if they can appear 
after an extension of jurisdiction or sovereignty of a coastal State over the high seas. Indeed, 
the freedom of fishing in the high seas prevents States from making any claim that would 
exclude others from enjoying this freedom.132 This issue is closely related to the extension of 
the territorial sea from six to twelve nautical miles (nm) (2.2.2.1) or the apparition of the EEZ 
under the LOSC regime and the survival of historic fishing rights (2.2.2.2). 
 
2.2.2.1. In the territorial sea 
The territorial sea as an extension from the mainland where coastal States exercise sovereignty 
has always existed in the law of the sea. The breadth of this zone has varied over time, from 
State to State and was established at twelve nm after UNCLOS III.133 When it comes to historic 
and traditional rights in this area, two cases can be differentiated. First, these rights can have 
been established over time as an adverse practice in a coastal State’s territorial sea that was 
already existing as the fishing practices started. Second, those fishing practices may have taken 
place in what used to be the high seas but found itself falling under a coastal State’s sovereignty 
after an extension of the territorial sea’s breadth. 
The South China Sea Arbitration pronounced itself on the matter as it states: “established 
traditional fishing rights remain protected by international law.”134 It implies that, no matter the 
territorial sea subject to a coastal State’s sovereignty, historic and traditional fishing rights may 
be exercised by the nationals of any State.135 Indeed, the Philippines and China were disputing 
the status of Scarborough Shoal and which State had sovereignty there. The question turned out 
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to be irrelevant, for the Tribunal, which could not deal with a matter of land sovereignty, 
decided:  
Consistent with the limits on its jurisdiction, the Tribunal has refrained from any decision or 
comment on sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal. The Tribunal also considers it imperative to 
emphasize that the following discussion of fishing rights at Scarborough Shoal is not predicated 
on any assumption that one Party or the other is sovereign over the feature. Nor is there any 
need for such assumptions. The international law relevant to traditional fishing would apply 
equally to fishing by Chinese fishermen in the event that the Philippines were sovereign over 
Scarborough Shoal as to fishing by Filipino fishermen in the event that China were sovereign. 
The Tribunal’s conclusions with respect to traditional fishing are thus independent of the 
question of sovereignty.136 
The Award does not seem to make a distinction between historic and traditional fishing rights 
established in an existing territorial sea or after the high seas, in which the fishing practices 
were carried out, fell under a coastal State’s jurisdiction. Thus, it can be interpreted that in either 
case, historic and traditional fishing rights can be preserved in the territorial sea. The outcome 
is however different when it comes to the EEZ. 
 
2.2.2.2. In the EEZ 
One of the main achievement that arose with the ratification of the LOSC is the establishment 
of the EEZ.137 This new maritime zone is regulated in Part V of the LOSC and grants coastal 
States sovereign rights on marine living resources, among other prerogatives.138 These 
sovereign rights that a coastal State possesses extend up to 200 nm from the baselines.139 Such 
a regime was an innovation. However, even before the LOSC ratification, some States like the 
UK and Iceland declared or tried to establish an EFZ off their coasts to secure their interests 
related to fisheries. The ICJ recognized this practice as being part of customary international 
law in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case opposing the UK and Iceland.140 
These newly created EEZs reduced the high seas portion of the oceans, where freedom of 
fishing applied. As a consequence, States or communities of fishermen who used to fish in 
certain parts of the high seas, could not carry out their activities anymore, for some of their 
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fishing grounds fell under a coastal State’s jurisdiction. According to the LOSC and its Article 
56(1)(a), in its EEZ, a coastal State has “sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and 
exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living.”141 
However, the EEZ regime does not mean that States could not access each other’s EEZ in order 
to fish. Part of a coastal State’s jurisdiction over its EEZ is the possibility to determine a total 
allowable catch.142 This refers to the maximal quantity of fish resources that can be harvested 
and the surplus that the coastal State could not use is left over to other States, according to 
certain criteria.143 One of the issues arising with these increasing powers of the coastal State 
upon such a large maritime area is the fate of States or fishermen who consider to have 
traditionally fished there, as it was the high seas and who now find themselves impaired in 
carrying out their activities. Thus, the question whether historic and traditional fishing rights 
that used to be carried out in the high seas still exist in the EEZ will be looked into. Indeed, it 
cannot be considered that coastal States have a “residual jurisdiction” in the EEZ, as a form of 
jurisdiction defined negatively in comparison to the rights of other States. However, the creation 
of the EEZ may not have impacted all claims made by other States. Thus, a balance has to be 
found with rights that other States may potentially have in the same area.144 The apparition of 
the EEZ being so closely linked to the ratification of the LOSC, the coexistence of historic or 
traditional fishing rights and the EEZ will be looked into in the part about the influence the 
LOSC ratification had on these rights.145 As will be seen, the South China Sea Arbitration and 
the Eritrea v. Yemen case came up with different solutions for that matter. 
 
2.3. The impact of the LOSC on historic and traditional fishing rights 
In order to frame out the impact that the LOSC had on the historic and traditional fishing rights 
regime, different sources will be looked into. As a first step, the content of the LOSC in respect 
to that matter will be investigated (2.3.1) and as a second step, case law will be touched upon, 
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2.3.1. Information provided by the LOSC 
Historic rights in general are not directly regulated by the LOSC. It is reminded by the 
Philippines in the South China Sea Arbitration, which states that the negotiations of the 
Convention took some preexisting rights into consideration but did not create specific 
provisions for historic rights.146 They are to be found through other provisions dealing with 
related issues. In the case of sovereignty-based historic rights such as historic waters for 
instance, there were strong resistances during the elaboration of the LOSC to include a special 
regime in that respect.147 For example, Article 15 LOSC relates to the delimitation of the 
territorial sea between States with opposite or adjacent coasts. In this scenario, an equidistant 
line is drawn in order to preserve each party’s interest. However, this method doesn’t find 
application if historic titles are at variance with it. The boundary line might be modified in order 
to preserve historic titles of another State over an area. The historicity of the title gives rise to 
an historic right that precedes the equidistance principle in this case.  
It can be observed from investigating historic titles and Article 15 LOSC, that all kind of 
historical considerations were not left out of the territorial sea regime. However, no such 
provision is to be found in Part V of the LOSC regarding the EEZ, which could speak for the 
absence of historic claims in that maritime zone. Since the LOSC does not contain any specific 
provision regarding historic titles, the Preamble is to be applied. The eighth paragraph states: 
“Affirming that matters not regulated by this Convention continue to be governed by the rules 
and principles of general international law.” Thus, the regime of historic waters for example, is 
governed by general international law.148 
When it comes to historic and traditional fishing rights, the UNCLOS negotiations also 
witnessed objections to acknowledge historic and traditional fishing rights in another State’s 
EEZ.149 No direct regulation exists on the matter, but these rights are mentioned on several 
occasions. It has been said earlier that States can allocate the surplus of fish stocks they 
harvested in their EEZ from their total allowable catch to other States. This allocation happens 
following certain criteria, among which is Article 62(3) LOSC. This provision mentions “the 
need to minimize economic dislocation in States whose nationals have habitually fished in the 
zone.” Historic and traditional fishing rights are not expressly mentioned here, but it is to 
understand that if such activities as described earlier have taken place in a State’s EEZ, they 
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have to be taken into account.150 However, this Article does not give a preferential right on the 
total allowable catch to States who might claim historic or traditional fishing rights. Moreover, 
it can be argued that there would be no need for such a provision if the LOSC drafters intended 
to preserve historic and traditional fishing rights in the EEZ. Indeed, a clearer formulation could 
have been used.151 
Article 51(1) LOSC is a provision that expressly mentions ‘traditional fishing rights’ in relation 
to archipelagic States. These States are allowed to establish ‘archipelagic waters,’ that have a 
specific status. It contains the duty to “recognize traditional fishing rights and other legitimate 
activities of the immediately adjacent neighbouring States in certain areas falling within 
archipelagic waters.” The provision gives two precisions on its application. First, it applies not 
only to adjacent States but also to neighbouring States, which broaden the scope of the rights’ 
holders. Secondly, it only aims at guaranteeing traditional fishing rights within the archipelagic 
waters, not on the EEZ outside of the archipelago. This element might be of interest when 
considering the intentions of the drafters to make the EEZ a zone on which the coastal States 
have strong entitlements.152 
Since the LOSC itself does not provide much insight in the problematic of its coexistence with 
historic and traditional fishing rights, it is necessary to look into how the jurisprudence ruled 
on the matter. However, only considering the LOSC, it appears as though its provisions do not 
preserve historic and traditional fishing rights. 
 
2.3.2. Position of case law on the matter 
Courts and Tribunals were confronted with the issue because of the disagreements States have 
on that matter, as will be looked into. A unanimous stance does not exist, even within 
‘developed’ States. Most States defend a strong EEZ, where the coastal State’s jurisdiction 
precedes any claim other States may have in the same area, while others like Australia and 
New-Zealand are in favour of guaranteeing historic rights for a delimitated time.153 It is 
interesting to study cases on historic rights in general after the adoption of the LOSC in order 
to see what role these rights play under the new regime. 
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As a first step, judgements rendered prior or contemporary to UNCLOS III shall be looked into. 
The Fisheries Jurisdiction case between the UK and Iceland dealt with the creation of an EFZ 
by Iceland and the historic fishing rights the UK pretended to have in the same area. 154 The ICJ 
decided in this case that Iceland could not establish an EFZ per se, for it would infringe on “the 
UK’s historic rights and economic dependency on certain fish stocks located in such a fishing 
zone.” A fishing zone could be established but not in an exclusive way.155 Thus, this decision 
speaks for the conservation of historic and traditional fishing rights in zones were a coastal 
State seeks to possess sovereign rights over marine living resources. However, it should be kept 
in mind that this process happened prior to the ratification of the LOSC. In 1982, year in which 
the UNCLOS III negotiations took an end, a decision involving historic rights and EEZs was 
taken by the ICJ. The Tunisia v. Libya case “recognized the emerging concept of the EEZ.” It 
explained that the at the time fairly recent LOSC contained provisions about historic claims “in 
a way amounting to a reservation to the rules set forth therein.”156 However, the case did not 
involve fishing rights, but the delimitation of the continental shelf157 and the Court did not get 
to pronounce itself clearly on the survival of historic rights following UNCLOS. Indeed, the 
historic rights and titles claimed by Tunisia were contained within the 200 nm in which rights 
could be claimed.158 
The ICJ pronounced itself in the Gulf of Maine case relating to maritime boundary delimitation 
and the influence fishing practices might have in that respect.159 Therefore, this case is slightly 
different from the Fisheries Jurisdiction case between the UK and Iceland, for it does not 
directly relate to fisheries. The United States used to have a strong presence in this high seas 
area when it came to fisheries activities, but the Gulf was to fall under Canadian jurisdiction. 
The US wanted the historic interests that its fishermen had in the region to be taken into 
consideration when establishing the final maritime boundary. However, the ICJ refused this 
argumentation and stated that “whatever preferential situation the United States may previously 
have enjoyed, this cannot constitute in itself a valid ground for it is now claiming the 
incorporation into its own exclusive fishery zone of any area which, in law, has become part of 
Canada.”160 Thus, it seems in this case that claims about historic rights did not play a role in the 
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context of an EFZ. Prior to Canada’s extension of jurisdiction, the US were making use of the 
freedom of the high seas and the “shared regime was terminated when coastal States’ 
jurisdiction was extended.”161 The South China Sea Arbitration used this case to justify its 
argumentation and mentions the different subject at hand. Even though the claims brought to 
the South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal were not relating to maritime boundary delimitation, the 
decision used the interpretation of the LOSC brought forth in the Gulf of Maine case to support 
theirs.162 
As a second step, decisions taken after the LOSC ratification will be investigated. The South 
China Sea Arbitration found a decision contrary to that of the ICJ in the Fisheries Jurisdiction 
case, which established that historic fishing rights could not be ignored if a State decided to 
claim preferential rights in fishing off its coasts.163 The Arbitral Tribunal argued that when this 
case was tried in 1974, the LOSC was not set in force yet and the concepts of EEZ or EFZ had 
not yet emerged or were heavily debated.164 However, the decision found by the Tribunal can 
also be subject to criticism as it will be looked into.165 With the nine-dash line China was 
claiming historic rights in the South China Sea and maintained that this line “does not contradict 
the obligations undertaken under UNCLOS; rather, it supplements what is provided for in the 
Convention.”166 By this, China was arguing that historic fishing rights were preserved under 
the EEZ regime, as provided for by the LOSC. However, the Tribunal decided otherwise and 
established a different system depending on the maritime zone these rights were carried out. 
The South China Sea Tribunal came up with the following question after considering China’s 
and the Philippines’ claims: 
Does the Convention, and in particular its rules for the exclusive economic zone and the 
continental shelf, allow for the preservation of rights to living and non-living resources that are 
at variance with the provisions of the Convention and which may have been established prior to 
the Convention’s entry into force by arrangement or unilateral act?167 
The Award then goes on to give an answer to that question and starts by establishing that the 
Article 311 LOSC is applicable to the interactions between the Convention and historic 
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rights.168 This Article regulates the relations between the LOSC and other international 
agreements and states that rights derived from other agreements shall not be impaired by the 
ratification of the LOSC as long as they are compatible with it. In relation to that provision, the 
Tribunal also referred to the Article 30(2) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT)169 which provides for the prevalence of a newer treaty over an older one.170 After 
considering these articles, the Tribunal explains the possibilities of coexistence between the 
LOSC and historic rights. First, the Convention could explicitly permit or preserve historic 
rights, even if they do not take the form of an agreement. Second, if the LOSC does not contain 
direct rules on the matter, historic rights could be compatible with the Convention and 
interpretation of the latter would indicate the intention of including such historic rights. Third, 
if these historic rights were prior and incompatible with the Convention, then according to the 
VCLT, the LOSC would have priority.171 The Tribunal endorsed the third possibility, observing 
that no provision regulated such historic rights, as seen previously,172 and that these rights are 
incompatible with the Convention.173 As seen earlier, historic rights are mentioned in Article 
62(3) LOSC when it comes to allocate the surplus of the total allowable catch.174 The Tribunal 
interprets this provision as precluding from allocating even more rights in the EEZ. If historic 
rights were to be widely applicable in EEZs, there would be no need for a norm such as Article 
62(3) LOSC. 175 Where the drafters intended to preserve historic and traditional fishing rights 
in the new legal regime, they established provisions accordingly, as it is the case for 
archipelagic waters or the allocation of the surplus.176 Moreover, the tribunal relies on the 
development’s history of the concept of EEZ: 
In the Tribunal’s view, the prohibition on reservations is informative on the Convention’s 
approach to historic rights. It is simply inconceivable that the drafters of the Convention could 
have gone to such lengths to forge a consensus text and to prohibit any but a few express 
reservations while, at the same time, anticipating that the resulting Convention would be 
subordinate to broad claims of historic rights.177 
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The South China Sea Tribunal endorses in this case a more contractual approach to the LOSC, 
according to which, States parties agreed to relinquish some of their rights (here potential 
historic fishing rights) in order to gain more (here through the regime of sovereign rights over 
marine living resources in the EEZ).178 
The Eritrea v. Yemen decision, taken more than a decade before the South China Sea 
Arbitration, came up with a different solution on how to consider historic and traditional fishing 
rights in the different maritime zones contained in the LOSC. It ruled that “historic fishing 
rights by a third State in waters otherwise under the jurisdiction of a coastal State are not 
necessarily extinguished by UNCLOS.”179 However, even if it appears from the decision that 
those rights are applicable both in the territorial sea and the EEZ,180 coastal State sovereignty 
is an essential element that cannot be trumped by any right a third State might claim in this 
situation.181 
 
2.4. Concluding remarks 
It is this author’s opinion that the differentiation made by the South China Sea Arbitration 
between the territorial sea and the EEZ does not hold when it comes to the existence of historic 
and traditional fishing rights. Many arguments can speak against the solution according to 
which such rights were only preserved in the territorial sea of a coastal State and not in its EEZ. 
The motivation behind the South China Sea Arbitration, as was seen earlier, is based on a 
contractual view of the LOSC.182 States had to renounce claims based on historic or traditional 
fishing rights in another State’s EEZ, for they acquired sovereign rights over marine living 
resources in their own EEZ. The South China Sea Tribunal does not adopt the same view for 
the territorial sea, for its regime did not evolve greatly after the LOSC ratification.183 However, 
the Tribunal fails to take into account that the territorial sea under the LOSC was established at 
twelve nm, which for some areas might have represented an infringement on what used to be 
the high seas. Thus, in this case, the situation is quite similar to the infringement on the high 
seas that the creation of EEZs represented. The main difference relies on the fact that a coastal 
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State enjoys sovereignty over its territorial sea, not only sovereign rights over marine living 
resources. However, this speaks against the South China Sea Award as was noted by Kopela: 
This may give rise to the question of why States would accept (and have accepted) such a 
restriction in a zone in which they exercise sovereignty (and which is very important both for 
economic and security reasons), but not in a maritime zone further away from their coasts in 
which they exercise sovereign rights.184 
The reason for refusing the existence of historic and traditional fishing rights in the EEZ might 
reside in the fact that the coastal State never got to give at least its acquiescence to a certain 
fishing practice that used to be carried out on the high seas an now finds itself in the newly 
created EEZ. Fitzmaurice, well before the LOSC was set in force, explains in relation with 
historic claims to non-exclusive rights in now called territorial seas, that sometimes, “it would 
not be necessary to prove consent or acquiescence in the fishing by other States, but merely the 
fact of it,” if waters that were part of the high seas were to fall under “the territorial or national 
waters of another State.”185 Kopela’s argument reproduced earlier with respect to the greater 
control of a coastal State in its territorial sea than in its EEZ is applicable in this case as well. 
If historic and traditional fishing rights can be recognized in the territorial sea, based merely on 
the existence of the fishing practices, it would logically also be the case for the EEZ. 
It would imply for a coastal State to recognize historic and traditional fishing rights in its EEZ 
if it can be established that these activities took place as the area was under the high seas regime. 
It appears that this solution might compensate what the South China Sea Arbitration is lacking, 
which is to take into consideration the special interests of local communities that depended for 
generations on these fishing practices. The Eritrea v. Yemen Arbitration considered these 
interests and came up with a different decision. As seen earlier, the decision establishes a clear 
link between traditional fishing rights and artisanal fishing. Those rights can be exercised in all 
maritime zones, regardless of sovereignty over these areas. In that case, the will to protect the 
interests of local communities seems to appear more clearly.186 
Examining the regime applicable to the continental shelf may help arguing towards a more 
flexible approach on the coexistence of historic or traditional fishing rights and the EEZ. Article 
77(3) LOSC establishes indeed that the continental shelf is inherent to the coastal State. Neither 
occupation nor a proclamation is needed to guarantee its jurisdiction on the continental shelf. 
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This regime makes it intrinsically incompatible to claim any historic or traditional fishing 
rights. Indeed, it was the aim of the drafters to “[defeat] any claim of historic waters, title or 
rights.”187 This regime is different from the one applicable to the EEZ, that needs to be 
proclaimed by the coastal State.188 The fact that an EEZ is not inherent makes it necessary to 
balance out any rights that other States might have in the same area, including historic and 
traditional fishing rights. The argumentation brought forth by the South China Sea Arbitration 
regarding the antagonism between the motivation behind establishing the EEZ regime and any 
opposing right of other States, might fail to see that such an incompatibility is not as straight 
forward as that of the continental shelf regime. Moreover, the territorial sea as a maritime zone 
could to some extent be recognized as being inherent to a coastal State. Indeed, territorial waters 
have existed throughout history and need not be claimed under the new LOSC regime.189 The 
territorial sea as a maritime zone cannot be entirely compared with the continental shelf, 
however, it seems contradictory to consider historic and traditional fishing rights antinomic to 
the continental shelf, but not the territorial sea. Logically, these rights should have been erased 
altogether, which did however not happen. This can be proof of the will to preserve the interests 
stemming from fishing practices. Accordingly, they should also apply to the EEZ. 
As a last argument against the decision made by the South China Sea Tribunal, it has been 
established that the LOSC does not directly recognize historic and traditional fishing rights.190 
However, practice has shown that agreements taking such rights into account have been signed 
between States regardless of the LOSC. It is the case between India and Sri Lanka or Australia 
and Papua New Guinea for instance. These examples may show the will of some States to 
acknowledge existing fishing practices outside of industrial circuits and their actors.191 
 
3. The applicability of the historic and traditional fishing rights legal regime to fisheries 
after Brexit 
The application of historic and traditional fishing rights after the LOSC ratification and 
depending on maritime zones has been looked into. Whether this regime can be of any relevance 
in the case of Brexit will now be investigated. After the referendum that took place the 23 June 
2016, the UK decided to leave the EU. After years long of negotiations, the formal withdrawal 
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happened on the 31 January 2020. However, a transition period shall be applied until 31 
December 2020 and can be prolonged until the 31 December 2021. 192 This period is a time in 
which European Law will not entirely cease to apply in the UK and the European Single Market 
will still be accessible to the UK. One of the main characteristic elements of the European 
Single Market is the CFP that creates a common European EEZ.193 Every fisherman from the 
EU have a right to fish in that zone. After Brexit is laid out in every legal aspect, the UK shall 
recover control over their maritime zones and European fishermen are theoretically not to be 
treated any differently than other non-European fishermen.  
Indeed, the UK leaving the EU created great uncertainty pending a potential agreement. It 
appears that historic and traditional fishing rights in British waters could be closely linked to 
treaties that used to recognize fishing practices in certain areas, of certain species and in a 
definite amount of time. Thus, it is interesting to determine the nature of such rights and whether 
they can play a role in the post-Brexit situation. European States could be tempted to rely on 
such rights in order to maintain their fisheries activities in waters such as the UK’s territorial 
sea or EEZ, to which they used to have access and might now be barred from. Considering these 
elements, the relations between agreements applicable to the UK before Brexit and historic or 
traditional fishing rights will be investigated as a first step (3.1). Whether these rights existed 
before any agreement was signed shall be closer looked into in order to determine whether a 
revival of these rights after the denunciation could be considered. Following this first subpart, 
voisinage arrangements as a possible way to secure historic and traditional fishing rights will 
be touched upon (3.2). 
 
3.1. Granting historic and traditional fishing rights based on the fisheries legal regime 
before Brexit 
As a member of the EU, the UK was part of the CFP, which was the main framework for the 
fisheries legal regime in EU-waters. The CFP was built on the LFC which used to be the main 
instrument to regulate fisheries access in the European Economic Community (EEC).194 Thus, 
the LFC and the CFP represent fisheries access agreements, which means that they establish 
the rules for different States’ fishing fleets to access the waters of another State in order to 
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exploit its marine living resources. Following the vote on Brexit of July 2016, which implied 
that the CFP would not be applicable to the UK anymore, it was decided that the LFC would 
be denunciated as well. These two agreements, as they take into consideration “habitual”195 and 
“traditional”196 fishing practices that could be considered as historic or traditional fishing rights 
will be presented as a first step (3.1.1). As a second step, the effects of Brexit and the 
denunciation of the LFC on those historic and traditional fishing rights will be touched upon 
(3.1.2). 
 
3.1.1. Fisheries access agreements before Brexit 
The possibility for States to access the fisheries resources of another State depends partly on 
the nature of the maritime zone these activities are supposed to be carried out in. According to 
the LOSC, coastal States enjoy only sovereign rights on the exploitation of marine living 
resources in the EEZ, whereas they have sovereignty in their territorial sea.197 Several options 
are available in order to guarantee fishing rights in the territorial sea of another State. First, 
bilateral or multilateral fisheries access agreements can be signed between the coastal State and 
other States. There is also the possibility for historic fishing rights to be recognized and 
preserved.198 When it comes to the EEZ, as was seen earlier, if the LOSC does not contain rules 
on fisheries access,199 it gives information on how to allocate the surplus of the total allowable 
catch that could not be harvested by the coastal State. This can be done with regard to habitual 
fishing practices of other States in the area. 200 Several agreements contain rules on fisheries 
access (3.1.1.1). These as well as their links to historic and traditional fishing rights shall now 
be looked into (3.1.1.2). 
 
3.1.1.1. The London Fisheries Convention and the Common Fisheries Policy  
The LFC was signed in 1964, at a time were the concept of territorial sea as a zone where coastal 
State enjoy sovereignty was known, but whose breadth was not uniformly established around 
the world. Indeed, UNCLOS II failed to reach a consensus in this regard. Matters such as 
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fisheries access or historic and traditional fishing rights were left for the States to agree on.201 
The concept of EEZ did not exist at the time, but more and more States wanted to establish 
zones in which they could have jurisdiction over fisheries activities among others.202 The LFC 
relates to fisheries access and contains specific rules in this respect. It establishes the rights for 
parties to claim an EFZ within 12 nm and exercise exclusive jurisdiction in fisheries matters in 
this area. The EFZ is divided into two parts in which different rules apply. The first one 
extending from the baselines to six nm can be subject to transitional agreements for parties who 
habitually fished there. In the second one extending from six to twelve nm, rights to fish certain 
species can be recognized for parties who habitually fished there between 1953 and 1962.203 
The LFC also grants permanent access to parties who habitually fished in a certain area, on the 
basis of a voisinage arrangements. These arrangements are “reciprocity agreements, in that 
[they involve] an exchange of benefits of the same type between the two contracting States 
which each grant each other fishing rights in the zones subject to their respective 
jurisdiction.”204 The particular case of voisinage arrangements will be investigated later on.205 
The LFC was closely related to the EEC. Indeed, its parties all ended up being members of the 
EU and its Article 10 provided for the possibility of “the maintenance or establishment of a 
special régime in matters of fisheries.” The parties to the LFC envisaged the possibility that the 
EEC or its successor, the EU might develop a more integrated and comprehensive legal regime 
concerning fisheries.206 This expectation was fulfilled through the apparition of the CFP in 
1970. The CFP, as defined by the European Commission, is “a set of rules for managing 
European fishing fleets and for conserving fish stocks.”207 It is based on the EU Regulation 
1380/2013208 among others, that is the result of other regulations related to the CFP and 
amended over time. The CFP Framework’s provisions contain important principles. Its Article 
5(1) states that “Union fishing vessels shall have equal access to waters and resources in all 
Union waters.” The reference to Union waters encompasses theoretically both the territorial sea 
and the EEZ of EU Member States. On top of the principle of equal access, article 16(1) 
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regulates the allocation of fishing opportunities and provides that it shall be carried out “on the 
basis of either the principle of relative stability for existing fisheries or on EU Member State 
interests for new fisheries.”209 Now that the LFC and the CFP have been touched upon, the 
links to traditional fishing practices they establish shall be looked into. 
 
3.1.1.2. The links between the LFC or the CFP and traditional fishing 
practices 
Both the LFC and the CFP Regulation contain mentions of “habitual”210 and “traditional”211 
fishing practices. As explained earlier, the LFC allowed its parties to access halieutic resources 
within six and twelve nm, based on their habitual fishing practices between 1953 and 1962. The 
CFP Regulation in its Article 5(2) contains an exception to the free access principle. It states 
that, in the twelve nm zone off their coasts, Member States are allowed to “restrict fishing to 
fishing vessels that traditionally fish in those waters from ports on the adjacent coasts.”212 These 
restrictions on free access were agreed on in order for the UK, Denmark, Ireland and Norway 
to join the EEC. Indeed, they objected the equal access principle implemented by the CFP.213 
A consensus was found and with the exception of Norway, the applicants joined the EEC. 
However, exceptions exist to the possibility for States to restrict the access to the twelve nm 
zone off their coasts. According to Article 5(2) of the CFP Regulation, it cannot impair the 
arrangements reproduced in Annex I of the Regulation for the zone between six and twelve 
nm.214 These arrangements are the same as those established by the LFC: a list of States having 
rights to fish certain species in specific zones off the coasts of other States parties, based on 
fisheries activities that these States carried out between 1953 and 1962. Thus, including the 
arrangements from the LFC in the CFP Regulation implies incorporating the legal framework 
of the LFC into the CFP, which is EU law.215 Similarly, for the zone up to six nm,216 the 
possibility to restrict access to the twelve nm off the coasts is “without prejudice to the 
arrangements for Union fishing vessels flying the flag of other Member States under existing 
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neighbourhood relations between Member States.”217 This provision is a reference to voisinage 
arrangements, which shall be touched upon afterwards.218 
It appears that neither the LFC nor the legal framework of the CFP are strangers to the concept 
of historic fishing practices. However, they both take such practices into consideration only 
when it comes to the twelve nm off the coasts of a State party, which nowadays encompass the 
concept of territorial sea under the LOSC. No mention is made of the zone beyond twelve nm 
that could involve today’s EEZ concept. As seen earlier, the question of the coexistence 
between EEZ and historic and traditional fishing rights is highly debated.219 However, this issue 
is hardly relevant in the case of the LFC and the CFP, for they are not as widely applicable 
when it comes to traditional fishing practices. 
Looking into what is referred to as “habitual” fishing by the LFC220 or traditional fishing by the 
CFP,221 it raises the question whether these practices amount to the qualification of historic and 
traditional fishing rights. This issue will be now touched upon, in order to determine whether 
Brexit or the denunciation of the LFC has an influence on exercising such rights. 
 
3.1.2. The extinction of historic and traditional fishing rights after Brexit and the 
denunciation of the London Fisheries Convention? 
Brexit and the denunciation of the LFC had as consequence to free the UK of its obligations 
under both legal regimes. As seen earlier, these agreements contained mentions of habitual or 
traditional fishing practices that were already in place before the entry into force of the LFC or 
the CFP.222 If these can be qualified as historic and traditional fishing rights as they were 
investigated before, there could be the possibility for them not to be impacted or to be ‘revived’ 
after Brexit and the denunciation of the LFC. To answer this question, it is essential to determine 
whether the LFC or the CFP Regulation established those fishing rights (3.1.2.1) or merely put 
down on paper customary rights that existed beforehand, and which could be revived (3.1.2.2). 
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3.1.2.1. The establishment of historic and traditional fishing rights based on 
the LFC and the CFP? 
It is necessary in this case to differentiate between the different maritime zones at stake. As 
explained earlier, the LFC is only applicable up to twelve nm, which corresponds nowadays to 
the territorial sea, according to the LOSC.223 The CFP is applicable to Union waters, which 
encompass territorial seas and EEZs of EU Member States.224 However, reference to traditional 
fishing practices is only made in reference to the twelve nm zone off the coasts, as the rules 
implemented by the LFC have been taken over by the Annex I of the CFP Regulation. No 
reference is made of such practices in the EEZ or waters beyond twelve nm. Thus, only the 
regime applicable within those twelve nm will be looked into. 
However, this same Award explained that historic and traditional fishing rights were maintained 
in the territorial sea of other coastal States. Thus, the question of perseverance of such rights 
after Brexit is relevant. The first question to be considered is whether the LFC or the CFP could 
have created historic and traditional fishing rights because of the long time both regimes were 
applicable. This consideration is made under the assumption that these fishing practices did not 
exist before the different agreements were enforced. As the South China Sea Award states, 
historic fishing rights are established by “the continuous exercise of the claimed right by the 
State asserting the claim and acquiescence on the part of other affected States.”225 The 
longstanding usage, as investigated earlier, makes here no doubt.226 Indeed, the LFC was signed 
by the UK on 9 March 1964, ratified on 11 September 1964, the Convention entered into force 
on 15 March 1966 and was denunciated by the UK on 3 July 2017.227 Thus, it has been fifty-
one years between the moment of enter into force and denunciation, establishing a longstanding 
practice. However, the need for these activities to be acquiesced by the coastal State in which 
jurisdiction they take place, might be more complicated to establish. Indeed, as seen earlier, 
acquiescence does not constitute an express authorization on the part of the concerned State but 
more an absence of active protest, resulting in the termination of the activities.228 In the present 
situation, it cannot be argued that the UK acquiesced. The UK expressly permitted through a 
convention for other States to fish in a zone between six and twelve nm. This direct consent 
does not constitute acquiescence, thus making the qualification of fishing practices covered by 
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the LFC or the CFP Regulation as historic or traditional fishing rights impossible. As was 
shown in the Special Master Report from March 2004229 relating to the Alaska v. US case230 on 
historic waters, treaties can be used as evidence to prove the preexistence of a title to historic 
waters.231 As seen earlier, historic waters represent a form of historic rights related to 
sovereignty, contrarily to historic fishing rights.232 Thus, it can be assumed that the indications 
brought forth by the Special Master Report can be applied in the present situation as well. Using 
domestic US jurisprudence is relevant in this case, as it was explained by Symmons.233 Indeed, 
the decision relies on customary international law and is relevant for its developments. To 
conclude, the LFC and the CFP Regulation cannot be considered to have created historic fishing 
rights, but they could be an evidence of preexisting rights, as it will now be investigated. 
 
3.1.2.2. The revival of historic and traditional fishing rights preexisting the 
London Fisheries Convention and the Common Fisheries Policy? 
If historic fishing rights preexisting any agreement on fisheries matters were to exist, the 
question could be raised whether they could be revived after a denunciation. This matter is 
particularly relevant in the case of the dispute surrounding the Rockall islet. This rock off the 
coasts of Scotland is under the UK’s sovereignty even if Ireland disputes this title. The territorial 
sea around Rockall is not mentioned in the Annex I of the CFP Regulation, and as such, 
according to its Article 5(2), the access to fisheries in that zone can be restricted to vessels that 
traditionally fish there. Ireland precisely claims to have used the neighbouring waters to carry 
out fisheries activities. Harrison explains in an article for the Scottish Parliament that if historic 
fishing rights were to be proven in the area, the Brexit would not impact them. Indeed “their 
basis would be international law rather than EU law.”234 It is to understand here that, generally 
speaking, if an agreement regulating fisheries access were to be denunciated, historic rights 
constituted prior to the agreement could be revived. 
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However, these rights could have been erased by the ratification of the LFC and the entry into 
force of the CFP. Indeed, the regime of the LFC aimed at protecting habitual fishing practices 
between six and twelve nm and made sure to exclude “any possible historic fishing rights in the 
0-6 nm belt by providing in Article 9(1) LFC, that these rights had to be incorporated into 
transitional arrangements.”235 Through such arrangements, historic fishing rights in the area 
were meant to gradually disappear over time. The CFP did not change a lot to these 
considerations, drawing inspiration from the LFC.236 Moreover, even before the ratification of 
the LFC, access to fisheries in the UK’s territorial sea was based on agreements, preventing the 
concept of acquiescence to be verified. This can be observed through the different agreements 
that applied over history, such as access rights derived from royal privileges granted in the 17th 
century to the city of Bruges.237 To conclude, it appears that any potential historic or traditional 
fishing rights that may have existed before the implementation of the LFC or the CFP, have 
been eradicated by these agreements. Thus, a revival of preexisting rights is not to be considered 
in the zone up to twelve nm off the UK’s coasts. Now that the UK retrieved sovereign rights on 
its EEZ without the influence of the EU, the matter whether any potential historic or traditional 
fishing rights survived in that zone is the same debate as exposed earlier, on the coexistence of 
such rights and the LOSC EEZ regime.238 If any European State could successfully prove to 
have historic fishing rights in the area, they could face the argument that such rights have been 
taken over by the EEZ legal regime, as it was argued in the South China Sea Arbitration. 
However, a possibility to maintain a certain form of traditional fishing practices shall now be 
investigated: voisinage arrangements. 
 
3.2. Voisinage arrangements as a possibility to maintain historic and traditional 
fishing practices 
Bilateral agreements can be relevant when it comes to historic and traditional fishing rights. 
Already during UNCLOS II this issue was discussed. However, no consensus was reached and 
historic fishing rights in the territorial sea were left to be dealt with through bilateral 
agreements.239 The same issues arose during UNCLOS III despite the general willingness to 
establish a new maritime zone, the EEZ. However, certain fishing States were concerned about 
 
235 Schatz, ‘Fisheries in the United Kingdom’s Territorial Sea,’ supra note 195, p. 490. 
236 Ibid., p. 490, 491. 
237 See Ibid., p. 493. 
238 See part 2.3.2 Position of case law on the matter, p. 30. 
239 Kopela, ‘Historic fishing rights in the law of the sea and Brexit,’ supra note 3, p. 706. 
45 
the potential under exploitation of marine resources in the EEZs of ‘developing States’ that may 
not have the financial means to carry out these activities. Article 62(3) LOSC, which has been 
touched upon earlier,240 was drafted in order to address these concerns and guarantee a surplus 
to States that habitually fished in those areas. Since the issue of historic or traditional rights’ 
persistence in the EEZs of other States was not properly addressed by the LOSC, it has been 
proposed to leave it up to the involved States to come up with regional agreements, in order to 
grant a legal regime for those fishing practices.241 Such agreements have been adopted 
parallelly to the LOSC and  
the State practice reflected in these agreements may demonstrate that the survival of historic 
fishing rights in the territorial sea and the EEZ of a State will depend on the local circumstances, 
the fishing history and the intentions and attitudes of the relevant States.242 
Some States made use of the possibility to establish local fisheries agreements, such as India 
and Sri Lanka, Japan and Korea or China, Australia and Papua New Guinea.243 These 
agreements exist despite the EEZ regime and the sovereign rights on fisheries it carries. 
Voisinage arrangement are an example of such agreements and they will be defined in a first 
step (3.2.1). One of the starting point of this thesis being Brexit, the voisinage arrangements 
applicable in the UK’s waters will be looked into (3.2.2). 
 
3.2.1. The definition of voisinage arrangements 
Some of the aforementioned agreements are known as ‘voisinage arrangements’ and, as 
Symmons define them, they “[allow] mutual and reciprocal cross-boundary fishing practices in 
inshore waters.”244 Indeed, as Kopela reminds it, “certain neighbouring States have historically 
respected the habitual past cross-boundary inshore fishery practices by fishers of immediately 
neighbouring States up to the present time, despite changing maritime zones, that is, in their 
respective territorial waters, on the basis of complete reciprocity.”245 Voisinage arrangements 
can be qualified as remains from the old law of the sea246 and have been addressed in certain 
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decisions such as the La Bretagne Arbitration247 or the Barlow case, where the Supreme Court 
of Ireland defined them as follows: 
A voisinage arrangement is, as the name implies, an arrangement between neighbouring states 
under which fishermen […] had fished in each other’s waters. This reflects no doubt, the fact 
that fishing is an occupation with long traditions predating land boundaries. There are no border 
posts at sea, and fish do not carry passports. A voisinage arrangement is little more than a 
sensible recognition at official level of practice and tradition whereby fishing boats did not 
necessarily remain within the national waters but fished neighbouring waters.248 
It does not appear as though they have to take on a special form, such as a formal treaty. As 
will be investigated later on, the voisinage arrangement between Ireland and the UK appears to 
rely on an exchange of letters.249 This element is also part of what led to the aforementioned 
Barlow case. 
It appears here that voisinage arrangements can recognize and perpetuate historic or traditional 
fishing rights. However, an important question remains, which is whether they can create these 
rights and serve as justification for all kind of fishing practices detailed earlier. The idea that a 
historic right normally based on custom might be created by a treaty appears contradictory. 
However, could it be considered that the passage of time has an influence on that matter? Could 
old arrangements, applied for a long time, give rise to a usage that would carry on despite 
denunciation or forgetting of the treaty? As was seen earlier in the case of the LFC and the CFP, 
it appears not to be the case. They can merely be the evidence of an existing historic fishing 
right, but not create one. Nonetheless, Schatz defends the idea that these voisinage 
arrangements are not threatened by the UK’s aspirations towards an independent gestion of 
their halieutic resources.250 Indeed, they arose in a specific historical and political context of 
joined fisheries practices in certain areas, as it will be looked into later on.251 These voisinage 
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3.2.2. Voisinage arrangements in the UK’s waters 
In this subpart, voisinage arrangements shall be looked into as they exist in UK’s waters with 
France and Ireland (3.2.2.1) and as they could exist with other neighbouring States. Indeed, the 
question will be raised whether these arrangements could represent a possibility to secure 
claims of historic and traditional fishing rights in a post-Brexit fisheries legal regime (3.2.2.2). 
 
3.2.2.1. Existing voisinage arrangements between the UK and France or 
Ireland 
The question of voisinage arrangements in the context of Brexit occupies an important place in 
its own right. Indeed, the political context behind the apparition of such arrangements is quite 
different from what led to the conclusion of agreements such as the LFC or the CFP. This 
difference explains why the voisinage arrangements applicable in the UK’s waters have not 
been denunciated and why they should remain applicable. The particular status of voisinage 
arrangements will now be looked into, using existing agreements as examples. Two voisinage 
arrangements are currently applicable in the UK’s waters, one in which France is a party 
(3.2.2.1.1)252 and another in which Ireland is a party (3.2.2.1.2).253 
 
3.2.2.1.1. The voisinage arrangement between France and the UK 
The voisinage arrangement between France and the UK has the Granville Bay as geographical 
scope and is more recent than the one involving Ireland. It was signed in 2000 and represents 
“unquestionably a treaty under public international law.”254 Within the Granville Bay, specific 
islands are designated by the arrangements: the islands of Guernsey and Jersey, as well as other 
smaller islands surrounding them, such as Alderney and Sark. These islands are under the UK’s 
sovereignty but were not part of the EU even before Brexit.255 Their proximity to the French 
coasts imposes for both States to collaborate on some matters. Fisheries is one of them and the 
arrangement guarantees “reciprocal fisheries access” in the French and the islands’ territorial 
sea. A Joint Management Committee and a Joint Advisory Committee were created in order to 
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supervise cooperation.256 If the legal regime surrounding access to fisheries in the Granville 
Bay is stabilized since 2000, it has not always been the case, thus explaining the political 
difficulties that denunciating this voisinage arrangement would represent.  
Several treaties were applicable in the Granville Bay long before the 2000 arrangement. They 
were established in order to settle regularly occurring disputes between France and England. 
Indeed, the English authorities argued that French fishermen were causing great harm to their 
fisheries because of “extensive interference and aggressions […] on the coasts of Kent and 
Sussex.”257 English fishermen were also accused of “dredging for oysters off the French 
coasts.”258 In 1839, a convention was signed in order to settle these ongoing disputes and  
to define and regulate the limits within which the general right of fishery on all parts of the 
coasts of the two countries shall be exclusively reserved to the subjects of Great Britain and of 
France respectively.259  
This 1839 agreement was the first international convention to establish “the three-mile limit as 
the boundary of exclusive fishing on the British coasts, so far as French fishermen were 
concerned.”260 Despite the will of both parties to avoid any further disputes, several 
encroachments were observed, also due to the lack of applicability of the treaty on nationals 
other than French or English. Therefore, a new convention was signed in 1867 but was never 
ratified by France.261 Until 1965, various agreements followed and in 2000, the voisinage 
agreement applicable nowadays was signed.262 This arrangement finds its background in 1992, 
when the authorities of the Bailiwick of Guernsey decided to extend their fisheries jurisdiction 
up to twelve nm. An agreement was found with the French authorities in order to guarantee 
access to French fishermen, with some restrictions, however. Following incidents in the area, 
the French fishermen’s rights of access were restored as they were standing before 1992. The 
voisinage arrangement of 2000 was developed in order to “review and modernise the regime 
established pursuant to the Convention of 2 August 1839 and the instruments adopted or 
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concluded since then.” The “prosperity of local communities” as well as the will to establish “a 
special regime applicable to fishing activities in the Bay of Granville” are mentioned too.263  
As was touched upon earlier, the political context that led to one or the other voisinage 
arrangement was highly sensitive. Denunciating them might not be well received by the French 
fishermen and represent more instability in the already uncertain post-Brexit future.264 
However, the reform of the French-British voisinage arrangement is under consideration by the 
authorities of the Bailiwick of Jersey. Indeed, a petition was launched in order to call for the 
denunciation of the agreement held for “broken” by the Jersey Fishermen’s Association.265 A 
ministerial response was given and stated that a reform of the arrangement could be considered, 
but no revocation. Indeed, if it might be necessary to examine that the bases on which the treaty 
was signed are still respected, the arrangement guarantees equal opportunities and a form of 
sustainable management in the area. When it comes to the Bailiwick of Guernsey, a dispute 
arose right after the official exit of the UK from the EU on 31 January 2020. The administration 
of Guernsey bared access to its territorial sea from French fishermen and declared that fishing 
vessel which habitually fished there could continue to do so with a license. These new measures 
sparked criticism by the French authorities.266 Despite these several disputes, it does not appear 
as though the Granville Bay voisinage arrangement is about to be denunciated.267 The history 
and the regime applicable to the voisinage arrangement between the UK and Ireland is different 
and shall be looked into. 
 
3.2.2.1.2. The voisinage arrangement between Ireland and the UK 
The history of the voisinage arrangement between Ireland and the UK is quite complex as well. 
It relies on the strong historical ties that Ireland and the UK share.268 It applies to the fishing 
zones off the coasts of Ireland and Northern Ireland, where reciprocal fisheries access up to six 
nm is granted for vessels under a certain size.269 In recent times, the application of the 
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arrangement became controversial. The Supreme Court of Ireland dealt with it in the Barlow 
case. It tackled the issue of mussel fishing off the coasts of Ireland.270 Indeed, Irish fishermen 
contested the fact that large scale and industrial Northern Irish fishing practices could take place 
in Ireland’s waters. Moreover, many companies register their vessels in Northern Ireland in 
order to benefit from the specific rules under the voisinage arrangement. On this matter of flag 
of convenience, the Judgement indicated that these practices should be considered in the light 
of their historical context: 
They were very much a product of their time; a time when it was assumed fish were caught on 
vessels crewed by men, on their own account, rather than as employees of limited companies, 
and when civil servants addressed each other only by their surname, and when the concepts of 
aquaculture, and large scale commercial exploitation of mussels, were far in the future.271 
The voisinage arrangement with Ireland does not consist in a formal treaty as it is the case for 
the agreement with France: an exchange of letters took place in 1965, which is said to be the 
origin of the agreement.272 This raises the question whether this arrangement is a proper treaty 
or merely a gentlemen’s agreement. The Barlow case addressed this question and it was found 
that the exchange of letters was constitutive of a voisinage arrangement. Indeed, “that is after 
all how both parties to the arrangement have described it.”273 
On top of not having been “put into a formal treaty form,” the voisinage arrangement was not 
“expressly put into Irish (or British) reciprocating legislation as such.”274 In order to be lawful, 
the Northern Irish fishing practices had to comply with the Irish Constitution, which provides 
in its Article 10.1 that all natural resources belong to the State.275 The Article 10.3 establishes 
that provisions may only be made by law when it comes to the management of the State’s 
property. In that regard, the voisinage arrangement has to be written down in Irish law. As 
found in the Barlow case, this is however not the case: in order for the voisinage arrangement 
to be entirely lawful, it needs to be put into statutory form. This process has already started.276 
Now that existing voisinage arrangements have been analyzed, their role as a potential way to 
secure claims relating to traditional fishing practices by neighbouring States will be 
investigated. 
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3.2.2.2. Voisinage arrangements as a possibility to secure claims to historic 
and traditional fishing rights in a post-Brexit fisheries legal regime? 
It has been explained earlier that treaties cannot create historic or traditional fishing rights, for 
these are intrinsically customary. However, they can be an evidence that fishing practices took 
place in a certain area for a long time and could potentially help qualify those practices if the 
treaty were to be denunciated. It has also been explained earlier that the reason for voisinage 
arrangements to be established were highly political and sometimes due to ongoing disputes. It 
can be as well generally considered that historic and traditional fishing rights were erased by 
the ratification of the LFC and the CFP. Thus, Brexit and the denunciation of the LFC could 
result in claims of historic fishing rights by EU Member States, but that would not have chances 
of success. In this situation, if potential customary rights cannot be guaranteed, there could be 
the possibility to settle claims of historic fishing rights with a treaty such as a voisinage 
arrangement. It should be specified here that the UK would have no legal obligation to sign 
voisinage arrangements with their neighbours, but they could do so out of political concern. 
Several EU Member States could consider this option, based on several elements that will be 
looked into. They could rely on the requirements characterizing historic and traditional fishing 
rights in order to push for a recognition of the fishing practices of their nationals through a 
voisinage arrangement. Those requirements of a longstanding practice and acquiescence by the 
interested State were detailed earlier.277 Looking into the existing voisinage arrangements in 
which the UK is a party, other characteristics come to attention. It appears that geographical 
proximity is paramount, for it leads naturally to transboundary fishing practices. The Channel 
Islands are closer to the French coasts than from the UK’s shores and Northern Ireland as well 
as the Republic of Ireland are closely related. Another criterion appearing is the reliance of local 
communities on fisheries practices as it is the case as with both voisinage arrangements. Those 
fishing practices can rely on artisanal methods, perpetuated over time. Between the Republic 
of Ireland and Northern Ireland, resources such as oysters and mussels are important to local 
communities, as was indicated by the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee in the House of 
Commons. 278 The controversy and fears the ‘ban on fishing’ in the territorial sea of Guernsey 
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sparked within the French fishing community is also a proof of the importance that these 
fisheries practices represent for some people.279 
Some States argue – or could be legitimate to do so – that their fishermen carried out fisheries 
activities in British waters over centuries. It is the case for fishing nations such as Belgium, 
Denmark or the Netherlands. Right after Brexit was voted by referendum, Denmark indicated 
that their fishermen had carried out their activities in the UK’s waters since the 15th century. If 
the rights of their nationals to fish in those waters were impaired, Denmark informed that it was 
building a legal case to bring to the ICJ. However, since such claims were made in 2017, the 
situation does not appear to have evolved.280 Other States such as the Netherlands or Belgium 
carried out fishing activities in British waters over centuries.281 Treaties signed between those 
States and the UK could come as evidence of these practices. However, as was seen earlier, 
these treaties could have overtaken these customary fishing rights.282 Moreover, in order for 
these fishing practices to be taken into consideration, they should still be ongoing and be 
artisanal. Indeed, as was seen earlier, industrial activities cannot constitute historic or traditional 
fishing rights.283 
However, some interrogations remain when considering historic and fishing rights in the 
framework of voisinage arrangements. Since Ireland and France are still members of the EU, 
some other Member States could rely on the freedom of establishment granted by EU law in 
order to gain access to British waters through existing voisinage arrangements.284 For such 
loopholes not to threaten the existence of these arrangements, they should be modified in order 
to bring clarity in that respect.285 Moreover, the UK is now to be considered as a third State, 
which implies that all potential new voisinage arrangements regarding fisheries between the 
UK and a Member State of the EU could not be negotiated individually. Indeed, the EU has an 
exclusive competence for “external fisheries access relations,”286 which allows the EU 
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Commission to have oversight over the voisinage arrangements.287 Then, it is to be expected 
that the European Commission will take over the management of these arrangements. 
 
3.3. Concluding remarks 
In a legal fisheries regime were treaties and agreements take the upper hand over customary 
law, the situation involving the UK and its surrounding waters represent no exception. Fishing 
activities in the area have long been shaped by conventions signed between States whose 
nationals were engaged in transboundary fishing activities. Thus, if treaties can represent an 
evidence of traditional fishing practices, they can also have overtaken them, as it is the case 
with the LFC or the CFP. 
In any way, following Brexit, the priority if the UK was to restore their sovereignty over their 
fisheries. This can be witnessed through the denunciation of the LFC on 3 July 2017 shortly 
after the vote on Brexit took place on 23 June 2016.288 The short time frame in which both 
events happened also underlines the uncertainty surrounding the relevance of the LFC after the 
adoption of the CFP. Indeed, the latter could have overtaken the former.289 Generally, this also 
underlines how the debates about Brexit crystallized around the sovereignty of the UK on its 
own waters and the fisheries activities taking place therein.290 
 
4. Conclusion 
The first research question to be answered in this thesis regarded the relevance of historic and 
traditional fishing rights in today’s law of the sea and whether they could have been overtaken 
by treaties. One of the treaties in question is the LOSC and decisions such as the South China 
Sea case indicate that those rights only survived in the territorial sea of a coastal State and not 
in its EEZ. It appears that such decisions, or the literature arguing the extinction of historic and 
traditional fishing rights under the LOSC regime, fail to take into account the main purpose of 
recognizing such rights. Indeed, as shown earlier, these rights are closely related to the interests 
of specific communities, depending on such fisheries. The South China Sea Award appears to 
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only consider the interests of States under the EEZ regime without acknowledging that these 
might be different from those of local communities. The Tribunal might have recognized that 
China acted incompatibly with international law when it completely prevented Filipino 
fishermen from carrying out traditional fishing practices, however, it seems that these concerns 
stop with the outer limit of the territorial sea. The prevention of economic dislocation as a 
reason to take habitual fishing into consideration for the allocation of the surplus,291 does not 
apply for other cases, where traditional fishing rights are at stake. However, the risk of 
disrupting local livelihoods is real and entitling them to a special status will not threaten national 
economies related to fisheries. Indeed, the South China Sea Tribunal recognizes that certain 
fishing practices that were at stake, could no longer be qualified as artisanal for they were 
“sufficiently organized and industrial.”292 It is to be interpreted a contrario that fishing practices 
with an industrial character seek more than sustaining a community and might create imbalance 
with a coastal State’s rights over its maritime zones. Thus, traditional fishing practices are not 
a threat to economic balance and preventing them from the EEZ is more the result of a technical 
interpretation of the LOSC than the consideration of the actual interests at stake. Without 
considering the special interests of fishing communities as such, the decision rendered by the 
South China Sea Tribunal might be a consequence of the general trend of “conventionalization” 
of international law, touched upon earlier.293 Historic and traditional fishing rights might be 
seen as a solution from the past that can now be settled through agreements, the LOSC being 
one of them. 
With regard to the second research question about the relevance of historic and traditional 
fishing rights for the post-Brexit situation, the issue of these rights in relation to treaties is quite 
relevant when considering the interests of fishing communities. Indeed, the importance of 
treaties compared to customary law might become detrimental to these communities, who could 
find themselves disadvantaged after Brexit. During the time when the UK was a member of the 
EEC and later the EU, fisheries activities could be carried out with relative freedom, based on 
the CFP. Even before that time, certain conventions such as the LFC or the voisinage 
arrangements allowed for fishermen from certain States to access the UK’s waters. As 
mentioned earlier, on 31 January 2020, the UK officially left the EU. However, EU law will 
remain applicable for a certain period of time, parallelly to the negotiation of a trade deal 
between the UK and the EU. Should there be no deal on 1 January 2021, then fishermen from 
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neighbouring States would be barred from fishing in the UK’s maritime zones.294 This situation 
would represent a considerable setback for fisheries industries, but even more so for smaller 
communities whose economy rely on those fisheries. 
The other part of the second research question addressed other potential mechanisms preserving 
historic and traditional fishing rights. Voisinage arrangements were mentioned quite 
extensively in this thesis as way of securing fishing rights. These rights cannot be qualified as 
historic and traditional for they are not customary. However, they do rely on historic practices 
and a specific agreement was deemed necessary in order to protect them, due to a very specific 
political and geographical context. Other States neighbouring the UK could have fishermen in 
similar situations and as such, their practices could theoretically be protected by such a 
voisinage arrangement. However, in the context of the EU, such a solution does not appear to 
be appropriate. Indeed, the European Commission would be the one overlooking the application 
of these agreements and not the State Party.295 Moreover, such a diversity of fisheries regimes 
within the EU might be contrary to the harmonization the EU strives for.296 As for the existing 
voisinage arrangements, it appears that neither the UK nor France or Ireland have the intention 
of denunciating them. Therefore, it should be necessary for any agreement between the UK and 
the EU to mention both voisinage arrangements and how their existence is not to be questioned. 
However, as of the time of this thesis’ writing, any agreement before the end of the transition 
period on 31 December 2020 seems very unlikely.297 
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Table 1: Access to the waters of the United Kingdom within 6-12 nm 
State  Description  
Belgium  unlimited access to five coastal areas in which demersal species and/or herring may be fished  
France  unlimited access to a variety of (and in some cases all) species in fifteen coastal areas  
Germany  unlimited access to herring (and in one case mackerel) in six coastal areas  
Ireland  unlimited access to demersal species and nephrops in two coastal areas in the Irish Sea and off the west coast of Scotland  
The 
Netherlands  unlimited access to herring in three coastal areas  
 
Table 2: Access of the United Kingdom to EU Member State waters within 6-12 nm  
State  Description  
France  unlimited access to herring in a coastal area adjacent to the Belgian/French border  
Germany  unlimited access to cod and plaice in the waters around Heligoland  
Ireland  
unlimited access to demersal species, herring and mackerel in one coastal area in 
the South of Ireland and unlimited access to these species as well as nephrops 
and scallops along the entire east coast of Ireland  
The 
Netherlands  
unlimited access to demersal species in a coastal area west to the 
Netherlands/German border  
 
